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Am I My Brother’s Keeper?                                      
A Tax Law Perspective on the Challenge of 
Balancing Gatekeeping Obligations and Zealous 
Advocacy in the Legal Profession 
Richard Lavoie* 
Recently the question of whether lawyers have a general ethical 
obligation to serve a gatekeeping function has been raised in a number 
of legal contexts.  The reaction of the practicing bar has generally been 
unenthusiastic.  While the assertion that a gatekeeping function should 
be applicable to all attorneys is a relatively modern stance, such an 
obligation has historically been acknowledged to various degrees in 
several practice areas, including federal income taxation.  This Article 
examines the gatekeeping question—and how the practicing bar should 
react to it—through an examination of the gatekeeping role historically 
asserted as applicable to tax lawyers, including how modern pressures 
(e.g., literalist statutory interpretation, profit maximization law firm 
models, changing business and societal ethical norms) have altered that 
historically asserted ethical norm.  This Article then suggests avenues 
for combating modern trends in the tax field in order to strengthen and 
reestablish the historic balance in a tax lawyer’s planning role (e.g., 
using intentional conflicts of interest to create a “divide and conquer” 
dynamic between clients and attorneys in aggressive transactions, 
emphasizing the ethical training of tax attorneys, clarifying the proper 
approach for statutory interpretation in the tax context, creating 
disincentives for a legal race to the bottom among attorneys competing 
for business, highlighting the importance of individual trendsetters, and 
channeling the competitive pressures in the legal marketplace in the 
government’s favor).  This Article concludes by suggesting that the 
practicing bar should take lessons from the tax gatekeeping example in 
its future reactions to gatekeeping initiatives in other legal arenas and 
accept gatekeeping as a generally applicable ethical norm. 
 
* Professor, University of Akron School of Law; Dartmouth College, A.B.; Cornell 
University, J.D.; New York University, LL.M. (Taxation).  I appreciate the helpful comments of 
Laurel Terry, Michael Hatfield, and the members of the Law, Society, and Taxation Collaborative 
Research Network on earlier drafts of this Article.   
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And the LORD said unto Cain, Where is Abel thy brother? And he 
said, I know not: Am I my brother’s keeper? 
 – Genesis 4:9 
INTRODUCTION 
The essence of the relationship between a lawyer and a client has 
traditionally been that of a zealous advocate.  As Lord Henry Brougham 
famously stated: 
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all 
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all 
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, 
and, amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in 
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the 
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a 
patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the 
consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his 
country in confusion.1 
 In modern times, Lord Brougham’s admonition that a lawyer should 
not consider the societal consequences of zealously defending a client 
has been questioned.2  More recently, some have gone even further and 
questioned whether lawyers generally have an affirmative obligation to 
act as gatekeepers to safeguard the structure and purpose of the law.3  
Such a gatekeeping role does not require lawyers to abandon their 
obligation to their clients and assume the role of government regulators, 
 
1. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (1821) (emphasis added).  To understand the full import of 
the emphasized language it is necessary to place Lord Brougham’s statement in its historical 
context.  Queen Caroline was popular with the masses, but had been charged with adultery.  
However, her husband King George IV also had a secret indiscretion.  While he was heir-
apparent, the King had secretly married a Catholic.  If this fact became known, the King would 
have lost his own title pursuant to the Law of Settlement.  The quoted language was part of Lord 
Brougham’s opening statement in defense of Queen Caroline and represented a direct threat that 
Lord Brougham would not hesitate to produce this evidence against the King if required to defend 
his client, no matter the resulting confusion and tumult to the country.  Monroe H. Freedman, 
Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1213, 1215 (2006).   
2. See generally David Luban, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); 
DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); 
Robert Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); William Simon, The 
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29. 
3. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2006); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party 
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating 
Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006); W. Bradley Wendel, 
Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005).  The gatekeeping role 
envisioned in these works goes well beyond the traditionally accepted notion that a lawyer is an 
“officer of the court,” and therefore, among other duties, cannot knowingly make false statements 
to a tribunal or fail to disclose controlling adverse authority.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011) and associated comments.  
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but it does envision attorneys taking an evenhanded approach to 
interpreting the law when advising clients.  A gatekeeping function 
seeks to mitigate the excesses that can arise from zealously advancing 
client interests by requiring attorneys to counsel clients with an eye 
toward promoting respect for the law.  While lawyers need not place 
themselves in the position of an impartial judge in providing client 
advice, they should recognize that they have a duty to uphold the law 
and promote its fair operation when assisting clients predisposed to 
taking a decidedly myopic view of law.4  Indeed, in the realm of the 
securities laws, Congress and the Securities Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) have moved to require lawyers to assume a proactive 
gatekeeping role in policing their clients’ actions via legislation,5 
regulations,6 and prosecutions.7 
While the idea that gatekeeping is a general obligation of all lawyers 
is relatively new, the tax bar in the United States has been debating 
whether it has a special gatekeeping obligation almost since the 
inception of the income tax.8  Over most of the modern income tax era, 
the prevailing view of commentators has been that the unique nature of 
the tax system requires tax lawyers to have an ethical obligation to 
create, nurture, and promote a fair tax system.9  Additionally, as a 
 
4. Wendel, supra note 3, at 1177–78. 
5. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (directing the SEC to adopt 
certain rules of minimum professional conduct for attorneys); 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3(a) (2006) 
(allowing administrative actions against attorneys and accountants to censure, suspend, or bar 
them from appearing or practicing before the SEC).  
6. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–205.7 (2012) (implementing section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006), which deals with rules of professional responsibility for 
attorneys practicing before the SEC); 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2012) (allowing SEC to censure 
and bar attorneys from appearing or practicing before the SEC).  See also Roger Cramton, George 
Cohen & Susan Koniak, Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers after Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. 
REV. 725, 740–41 (2004) (discussing required reporting under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley). 
7. George W. Dent, Jr., Lawyers in the Crosshairs: The New Legal and Ethical Duties of 
Corporate Attorneys, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 337, 338 (2007) (“SEC enforcement actions 
[against attorneys] have mushroomed.  There is also concern that . . . the SEC has altered its 
enforcement program, and now under [its censure/suspension authority] it pursues attorneys 
allegedly guilty of nothing worse than negligence.  Private damage actions against lawyers also 
seem to have increased.”). 
8. See generally Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism, 
Duties and Advice, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2012).  Indeed, law review discussions regarding how 
far a tax practitioner can go in counseling tax reduction strategies to clients can be found as early 
as the 1920s.  See, e.g., John H. Sears, Effective and Lawful Avoidance of Taxes, 8 VA. L. REV. 
77, 85 (1921). 
9. See BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN & KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX 
PRACTICE § 101.2 (5th ed. 1999) (“The practitioner’s obligation to the client, however, is not 
unrestricted.  The practitioner also owes a duty, albeit less well-defined, to the tax system as a 
whole.”); Franklin Green, Exercising Judgment in the Wonderland Gymnasium, 90 TAX NOTES 
1691, 1692–93 (2001) (“[I]t has been a fundamental role of tax practitioners to identify for 
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practical matter, most tax practitioners had likely rendered legal services 
in a manner consistent with such a role, even if they did not specifically 
endorse gatekeeping as an actual ethical requirement.10  This reality, 
however, began to change with the advent of widespread lawyer-
assisted tax shelter activity in the 1970s and 1990s.  Despite academic 
protestations to the contrary, an ethical gatekeeping norm has, as both a 
formal and practical matter, been increasingly questioned and seemingly 
rejected by a large segment of the tax bar in recent decades.11  This lack 
of self-regulation has opened the door for the Government12 to insert 
 
taxpayers those tax return positions that may be attempted and those that are beyond the pale . . . .  
In a real sense, the tax adviser is a gatekeeper who regulates the flow of issues into the system  
. . . .  For self-assessment to be workable, tax advisers cannot fail to perform their gatekeeper 
function and cannot allow a floodtide of illegitimate issues to swamp the system.  Accordingly, it 
is imperative that tax advisers apply professional standards with intellectual honesty in 
determining what positions have enough credibility to be able to be asserted.”); Deborah H. 
Schenk, Tax Ethics, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1995, 2005 (1982) (reviewing BERNARD WOLFMAN & 
JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1981)); William H. Simon, 
Organizational Representation and the Frontiers of Gatekeeping, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 1069, 1073 (2011) (“[T]here is a longstanding tradition within the elite tax bar that 
embraces the gatekeeping role . . . .”).  For a detailed compendium of the leading tax ethics 
commentators on this point from the period between 1945 and 1965, see Hatfield, supra note 8, at 
15–28. 
10. That is, it was in the professional best interest of the practitioner to be seen by the taxing 
authorities as having high standards so that she would be in the best position to represent her 
client’s interests and to foster a less adversarial relationship between taxpayers and the 
government to everyone’s mutual benefit.  Hatfield, supra note 8, at 27–28.   
11. See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar into 
Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 46–47 (2001) [hereinafter Lavoie, 
Deputizing the Gunslingers] (discussing attorney complicity in tax shelter activity and advocating 
for a return to a tax lawyer gatekeeping function); David J. Moraine, Loyalty Divided: Duties to 
Clients and Duties to Others—the Civil Liability of Tax Attorneys Made Possible by the 
Acceptance of a Duty to the System, 63 TAX LAW. 169, 169 (2009) (advocating for the rejection 
of any tax practitioner duty to the system); Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers: The Organized 
Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 81 (2006) (suggesting that the 
organized tax bar’s law reform efforts can be understood as attempts to reinforce the professional 
authority of tax attorneys); William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional 
Responsibility of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1457–58 (2007) (noting the 
dichotomy within the tax bar between tax shelter “formalists” and anti-tax shelter practitioners 
who assert a duty to the tax system). 
12. This Article will use the term “Government” to generally refer to the panoply of 
legislative and executive aspects of the federal government that can play a role in regard to 
regulating attorneys generally, and in particular tax practitioners.  The Internal Revenue Service 
itself will sometimes be referred to as either the “IRS” or the “Service.” 
 In the tax context, federal government action can take many forms, from Congressional 
legislation to administrative actions.  On the administrative axis, the Treasury Department has 
primary responsibility for interpreting and administering the tax laws.  Primary responsibility for 
developing tax policy and reviewing tax regulations resides in the Treasury’s Office of Tax 
Policy.  However, the largest bureau within the Treasury Department is the IRS, which is 
responsibile for determining, assessing, and collecting the revenue owed by taxpayers.  Other 
Executive Branch agencies also have ancillary tax functions.  For instance, the Tax Division of 
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itself into the attorney-client relationship by both implicitly and 
explicitly regulating and proscribing attorney behavior.13  In the wake 
of these changes—coinciding with the severe economic downturn 
beginning in 2008—promotion of tax shelter activity of the type 
prevalent in the 1990s and early 2000s appears to have subsided.14 
Tax shelter activity can take many forms.15  The factors that led to 
the decline of the tax bar’s gatekeeping role in the 1970s and 1990s are 
still largely with us today despite recent Government actions.  It 
remains to be seen whether the next economic upswing will reignite the 
tax shelter industry despite recently erected roadblocks.16  If so, what 
 
the Department of Justice handles most tax litigation functions for the Government.   
13. See infra Part III.  See also Rachelle Y. Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185, 210–12 (2010) (advocating for the Government to do even more to 
formalize the gatekeeping functions of tax attorneys); Bret Wells, Voluntary Compliance: “This 
Return Might Be Correct but Probably Isn’t,” 29 VA. TAX REV. 645, 668–72 (2010) (advocating 
that a “more likely than not” tax return position standard be applicable for all taxpayers and 
advisors).  For more generalized discussions of the evolving role of the Government in 
prescribing the ethical responsibilities of lawyers in various areas, see Fred C. Zacharias, 
Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 338–44 (1994); Daniel R. Coquillette & Judith 
A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy: The Federalization of Legal Ethics through Legislative, 
Court, and Agency Regulations, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 123, 128–33 (2011); Eli Wald, 
Federalizing Legal Ethics, Nationalizing Law Practice, and the Future of the American 
Profession in a Global Age, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 514–23 (2011); Laurel S. Terry, The 
Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as 
“Service Providers,” 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189, 193–205 (providing various examples of U.S. and 
foreign governments regulating attorney behavior). 
14. See Tracy A. Kaye, The Regulation of Corporate Tax Shelters in the United States, 58 
AM. J. COMP. L. 585, 604 (2010) (noting that while corporate tax shelter activity has decreased it 
is likely to return when the economy improves if the Government is not vigilant); Susan Cleary 
Morse, The How and Why of the New Public Corporation Tax Shelter Compliance Norm, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 1013 (2006) (arguing that compliance norms at large corporations were 
strengthened by the Government’s responses to the most recent wave of corporate tax shelter 
activity). 
15. Over the years the tax bar has proved tremendously adept at developing innovative tax 
shelter transactions despite Government attempts to stamp out such transactions.  As Professor 
Martin Ginsberg famously noted, “The tax bar is the repository of the greatest ingenuity in 
America, and given the chance, those people will do you in.”  Legislation Relating to Tax-
Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue 
Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982) (statement of Martin 
Ginsberg, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).  Over the years Professor 
Ginsberg’s sentiment has frequently been expressed by others as well.  See generally JEFFERY L. 
YABLON, AS CERTAIN AS DEATH—QUOTATIONS ABOUT TAXES 223–59 (2010) (containing 
numerous quotes about tax evasion and planning, including: “Trying to control tax shelters is like 
stepping on Jell-O.  It just squeezes out between your toes and the mess is worse than when you 
began.” – Anonymous Congressional Staff Member; “What the low tax rate on capital gains does 
is spur a huge amount of unproductive tax sheltering. . . .  Similarly, the highly talented people 
who dream up tax shelters could, in a better world, do productive work.” – Leonard E. Burman; 
“At the heart of every abusive tax shelter is a tax lawyer or accountant.” – Charles Grassley; and 
“As the tax laws get tighter, the tax lawyers get smarter.” – Anonymous). 
16. See Kaye, supra note 14, at 604.  See also infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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role will tax practitioners play?  Will they resume a strong gatekeeping 
role and act to quash these new tax shelter schemes in their infancy?  
Or, will they adhere to Lord Brougham’s mantra and again plunge the 
tax system into disarray and confusion?17  If the latter, then the tax bar 
can expect the Government to place ever more draconian restrictions on 
them to dissuade their complicity in undermining the fairness and 
integrity of the tax system. 
A central thesis of this Article is that it is in the self-interest of all the 
parties involved to take decisive action now to return to and strengthen 
the tax bar’s historical gatekeeping function.  The Government would 
benefit by obtaining more accurate taxpayer reporting of transactions 
and avoiding the substantial distraction of dealing with yet another tax 
shelter crisis.  Society would benefit by having a stronger and fairer 
system of taxation that in turn bolsters the taxpaying commitment of all 
taxpayers.18  Attorneys would benefit by retaining their ability to self-
regulate as a profession, maintaining their status as professionals and 
preserving more latitude in assisting their clients in non-abusive tax 
situations.19  Clients benefit from being able to receive freer tax advice 
in structuring ordinary business transactions (advice that might be 
inadvertently curtailed as a consequence of stricter governmental 
involvement in attorney regulation) and by avoiding the time, expense, 
and angst of ultimately trying to defend abusive transactions before the 
Government and in the court of public opinion.20 
 
17. See supra note 1 (contextualizing Lord Brougham’s willingness to create a national 
controversy in his efforts to zealously represent and protect his client). 
18. See generally Richard Lavoie, Flying above the Law and below the Radar: Instilling a 
Taxpaying Ethos in Those Playing by Their Own Rules, 29 PACE L. REV. 637 (2009) [hereinafter 
Lavoie, Taxpaying Ethos] (concluding that there is a sufficient understanding of “taxpaying 
ethos” to warrant testing the principles of this theory, in hopes of reducing noncompliance within 
a traditionally problematic part of society). 
19. See Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional Responsibility, 
19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 167 (2006) (“[I]f lawyers are unwilling to recommit themselves to 
the regulation of their profession and their responsibilities to society, one might expect additional 
regulations [regarding attorney behavior].”); David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by Doing Good? The 
Role of Public Service in the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 83 
(2004) (“[S]uch sacred cows as self-regulation and the attorney-client privilege are likely to come 
under great pressure if lawyers lose their reputation as a ‘public profession’ dedicated to the 
public interest.”). 
20. See Michele Destefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment 
One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1310 (2009).  
See also Michele Destefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment 
Two: How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119, 1195 (2010) 
(advocating in favor of corporate attorneys providing advice regarding public opinion aspects of 
corporate transactions in light of results from an empirical survey study); Kathleen F. Brickey, 
From Boardroom to Courtroom to Newsroom: The Media and the Corporate Governance 
Scandals, 33 J. CORP. L. 625, 636 (2008) (giving specific examples of media campaigns 
6_LAVOIE 3/9/2013  1:36 PM 
820 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
While at one point the gatekeeping concept was thought to be sui 
generis to the realm of taxation, that position is no longer viable today.  
Over the years the legal environment has evolved from a broad 
constitutional and common law base into one increasingly focused on 
complex statutory schemes implemented and administered by regulatory 
agencies.  Thus, the primary factor that prompted calls for tax 
gatekeeping (i.e., the practical inability of the Government to 
comprehensively check and monitor adherence to the law, which thus 
necessitates a system of voluntary self-compliance by citizens) has 
emerged as a central reality in most regulatory contexts.  The calls we 
see today for increased attorney gatekeeping functions in other areas of 
the law derive largely from the Government’s recognition that it cannot 
effectively curtail unjustified citizen behavior without the help of the 
practicing lawyers working in that area to promote compliance by their 
clients.21  Just as in the field of taxation, if those attorneys fail to 
embrace a gatekeeping function on their own initiative, the Government 
can be expected to impose one on them that may well not be to their or 
to their clients’ liking.  The primary lesson to be learned from the tax 
experience with gatekeeping is the importance of preserving as much of 
the attorney-client relationship as possible by embracing self-regulation 
as a means of preempting more draconian changes that would otherwise 
likely occur. 
In discussing the lessons that can be garnered from the tax bar’s 
gatekeeping experience, this Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I 
discusses the history, theory, and practice of gatekeeping within the tax 
bar.  Part II highlights the decline in such gatekeeping activity as 
evidenced by the rampant tax shelter activity in recent times, and 
identifies some of the key factors that led to the weakening, and 
 
conducted by defendants and the methods these campaigns employed); David M. Sudbury, The 
Role of Corporate Counsel in the Criminal Environmental Case: Advice to Quench the Fire, 3 
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 110 (1992) (suggesting that any defense attorney who tells his or her client 
to remain publicly silent should be fired). 
21. See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of Gatekeepers: The Case of Immigration 
Enforcement, 2006 ILL. L. REV. 887, 894 (“The rationale for enlisting private gatekeepers turns 
on the limits of public enforcers and the comparative advantages gatekeepers may enjoy in 
overseeing the primary wrongdoers.”); Kraakman, supra note 3, at 61–66 (discussing the 
comparative advantage in enforcement obtained by creating gatekeepers to act as “chaperones” 
dealing one-on-one with prospective wrongdoers).  By way of illustration, attorney gatekeeping 
functions have now become part of the Government’s monitoring of compliance with the 
securities laws.  See supra notes 5–7 (discussing how, through legislation, regulations, and 
prosecutions, Congress and the SEC have required lawyers to assume a gatekeeping role).  
Similarly, as discussed at note 198, infra, pressure has been mounting in recent years to impose 
strict gatekeeping requirements on attorneys to assist the Government in monitoring money 
laundering and terrorist financing activities.   
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apparent abandonment, of the tax bar’s traditional gatekeeping role.  
Part III examines the potential risks to all parties involved if the tax 
bar’s gatekeeping role is not resurrected and discusses how a consensus 
in favor of an ethical gatekeeping norm can be forged despite 
competitive and other pressures pushing the bar in the opposite 
direction.  The Article concludes by exhorting the tax bar to directly 
confront the difficult challenges presented by the current legal 
landscape and undertake a concerted effort to entrench a strong 
gatekeeping norm to the ultimate mutual benefit of the tax bar, its 
clients, and the Government.  The Conclusion also observes that the tax 
gatekeeping example is highly relevant to other areas of the law where 
commentators and the Government are suggesting an attorney 
gatekeeping function is appropriate. 
I. TAX LAWYERS AS GATEKEEPERS 
A. What Does Tax “Gatekeeping” Entail? 
Lord Brougham’s standard of zealous advocacy stakes out a clear 
threshold for the extent to which an attorney can ethically consider the 
consequences of his actions to those other than his client.  In short, he 
cannot.22  However, once one grants that an attorney may, or must, 
ethically consider consequences beyond those to his client, shades of 
gray are introduced into the interpretation of a lawyer’s actions.  What 
are the parameters that define the scope of the lawyer’s gatekeeping 
role?  Should the duty be found only in a general duty to work for the 
betterment of the law on his own time as a lawyer-citizen, or does the 
duty extend to specific client representations?  If so, does it only reach 
client actions that are clearly accepted as illegal under current law, or 
can it intrude into areas where reasonable minds might differ regarding 
the legal outcome?  At the extreme, must an attorney limit his 
involvement to situations where the client’s position is clearly 
acceptable under current law? 
Even once the relevant scope is identified, what action must or may 
an attorney take when weighing his client’s interests against adverse 
consequences to others?  Is it sufficient to merely bring the tension to 
the client’s attention?  Or must he counsel against the client’s action?  If 
the latter, must the practitioner actually withdraw from the 
 
22. Of course, under even an extreme view of the zealous advocacy role, an attorney’s actions 
are not completely unfettered.  For instance, no one would claim that an attorney should be 
ethically permitted to fabricate or destroy evidence, make false statements to a tribunal, or act to 
further an ongoing crime.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011). 
6_LAVOIE 3/9/2013  1:36 PM 
822 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
representation if his counsel is ignored?23  Or does the obligation 
(especially if the harmed party would be the Government) run even 
deeper, compelling him to affirmatively bring the recalcitrant client’s 
actions to the attention of the injured party despite his general duty of 
client confidentiality?24  Finally, to what extent should the gatekeeping 
function differ based on the legal context, both in terms of the field of 
law involved and the type of advocacy being undertaken? 
In the tax field, the answer to these questions has typically been 
driven by concerns about dissuading overly aggressive tax planning.25  
There is little dispute regarding a tax attorney’s obligation to deal 
truthfully with the Government when responding to inquiries about 
underlying facts26 and to advise his client against taking frivolous or 
 
23. Under present ethical norms, a mandatory withdrawal in this context is limited to 
situations where the continued “representation will result in violation of the rules of professional 
conduct or other law.”  Id. R. 1.16(a)(1).  Should the client’s rejection of a lawyer’s gatekeeping 
advice be viewed as a violation of rules of professional conduct?  Should the permissive right of a 
lawyer to withdraw in situations where “the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer 
considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement” be made 
mandatory to further backstop a gatekeeping ethical norm?  Id. R. 1.16(b)(4).   
24. Even after withdrawal, an attorney generally must maintain client confidentiality, 
notwithstanding the client’s informed consent.  Id. R. 1.6(a).  The exceptions to this requirement 
are typically limited to situations involving a crime or fraud associated with a substantial financial 
or bodily injury.  Id. R. 1.6(b).  Should the ethical rules be expanded to encompass a client’s 
rejection of gatekeeping advice associated with legally questionable, but not definitively illegal or 
fraudulent, client actions?   
25. See Holmes, supra note 13, at 187 (“[T]he line between legitimate tax planning . . . and 
overly aggressive or abusive reporting by taxpayers continues to get pushed.”); Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax 
Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 874 n.153 (2002) (“The difference between tax 
avoidance and tax evasion is that the latter is illegal, while the former is just smart tax planning. 
The boundary between the two is blurry.”); Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers, supra note 11, at 
49 (“The inherent tension between legitimate tax planning and the creation of abusive tax shelters 
presents [a] line drawing exercise: which transactions should the tax law dissuade and prohibit as 
abusive, and which transactions should the tax law permit as attempts to work within the statutory 
framework toward the goal of legitimate tax minimization?”). 
26. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.20 (2011) (“A practitioner must, on a proper and lawful request 
by a duly authorized officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service, promptly submit 
records or information in any matter before the Internal Revenue Service unless the practitioner 
believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that the records or information are privileged.”); 
31 C.F.R. § 10.51 (2011) (explicitly noting that a practitioner may be censured, suspended, or 
disbarred from practice before the IRS for “[g]iving false or misleading information, or 
participating in any way in the giving of false or misleading information to the Department of the 
Treasury or any officer or employee thereof, or to any tribunal authorized to pass upon Federal 
tax matters, in connection with any matter pending or likely to be pending before them, knowing 
the information to be false or misleading”).  Of course, the rules of professional conduct explicitly 
state that an attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of any material fact to any party 
in representing a client.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1.  See also ABA Comm. on 
Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-375 (1993) (titled “The Lawyer’s Obligation to 
Disclose Information Adverse to the Client in the Context of a Bank Examination,” this opinion 
found that an attorney representing a client in the context of a governmental agency investigation 
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patently improper tax positions.27  Conversely, when a tax matter 
proceeds to actual litigation, the accepted view has been that a tax 
lawyer’s obligations are the same as in any other type of litigation.28  
The questions become harder when a tax lawyer is consulted in the 
planning stages of a transaction, where the legal questions presented 
rarely have clear-cut answers.  The role of the tax lawyer is to sort 
through the extant authorities and utilize her experience and judgment 
in determining the legal strength of a given tax position.29  The analysis 
is multifaceted, involving not just an intimate understanding of the 
particular statutory and regulatory provisions involved, but also a keen 
appreciation for the policy considerations underlying the rules, the non-
tax business motivations of the client, and the anticipated reaction of the 
judiciary if litigation ultimately ensues.  Despite this grounding, the 
lawyer’s view of the advisability of a transaction may often appear to a 
layman as simply a “smell test” akin to an “I know it when I see it” 
obscenity-like standard.30  The key, however, is that the grounding of 
the analysis should create a commonality in approach that leads most 
practitioners to reach similar conclusions regarding the appropriateness 
of any given transaction.31  As discussed in this Article, the scope of tax 
 
“may not under any circumstances lie to or mislead agency officials, either by affirmative 
misstatement or by omitting a material fact necessary to assure that statements made are not false 
or misleading”). 
27. As discussed herein, even with its most liberal interpretation, the bar has maintained that a 
tax return reporting position must have at least a “reasonable basis” for a practitioner to advise in 
its favor.  See infra at Part II.A.1 (discussing ABA Formal Opinion 314).  While the “reasonable 
basis” standard used in that opinion was interpreted by some as requiring only a “colorable basis” 
for a position, the position still could not be completely frivolous.  ABA Comm. on Ethics & 
Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (titled “Tax Return Advice: Reconsideration of 
Formal Opinion 314,” this opinion explained the need for clarifying the standard announced in 
Opinion 314).  Again, this also accords with the acknowledged limits to the zealous advocacy 
norm generally.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or 
defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact 
for doing so that is not frivolous.”). 
28. See Hatfield, supra note 8, at 52 (describing several different professors who agree that tax 
lawyers, when engaged in adversarial litigation, are involved in a process much like that 
experienced by typical attorneys).  As noted earlier, however, in recent times commentators have 
begun to question the extent to which a strong zealous advocacy standard is appropriate even in 
pure litigation settings.  See supra note 2. 
29. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the 
“Should” Opinion, 98 TAX NOTES 1125, 1125 (2003); Frank J. Gould, Giving Tax Advice—Some 
Ethical, Professional, and Legal Considerations, 97 TAX NOTES 523, 529 (2002); Richard 
Lavoie, Analyzing the Schizoid Agency: Achieving the Proper Balance in Enforcing the Internal 
Revenue Code, 23 AKRON TAX J. 1, 20 (2008); Detlev F. Vagts, Legal Opinions in Quantitative 
Terms: The Lawyer as Haruspex or Bookie?, 34 BUS. LAW. 421, 421 (1979). 
30. Dana L. Trier, Beyond the Smell Test: The Role of Substantive Anti-Avoidance Rules in 
Addressing the Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, 78 TAXES 62, 62 (2000). 
31. Richard Lavoie, Activist or Automaton: The Institutional Need to Reach a Middle Ground 
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gatekeeping is primarily centered on this gray area of aggressive tax-
motivated planning.32 
Within that scope, determining how strong a position needs to be 
before it can be ethically advised has been a matter of debate over the 
years.  Depending on the time period and the context, the answer has 
changed dramatically.  As discussed more fully in Part III, the 
Government’s return preparer penalty provisions now provide that, in 
essence,33 a tax advisor needs a reasonable belief that an advised 
position more likely than not would be sustained if there is either (1) a 
significant purpose of a plan or arrangement to avoid or evade federal 
income tax or (2) the transaction meets certain criteria causing it to 
qualify as a specifically reportable transaction.34  If the underlying 
transaction does not have a significant tax avoidance purpose, then an 
undisclosed position still must be supported by “substantial 
authority,”35 and a position that will be adequately disclosed by the 
taxpayer on his tax return must have a “reasonable basis.”36  A tax 
 
in American Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REV. 611, 625–26 (2005). 
32. See infra Part II.A (discussing the decline of tax gatekeeping and the rise of lawyer- 
facilitated tax shelter activity). 
33. The statutory standard discussed here, section 6694, only applies to a person who prepares 
at least a substantial portion of a tax return or claim for refund for compensation.  26 U.S.C. § 
7701(a)(36)(A) (2006).  However, the Treasury Department’s rules governing practice before the 
Internal Revenue Service (“Circular 230,” codified at 31 C.F.R. subtit. A, pt. 10 (2011)) are 
significantly broader and provide that “a practitioner may not willfully, recklessly, or through 
gross incompetence” advise a client to take a position on a tax return or claim for refund unless 
the section 6694 certainty standards are met.  31 C.F.R. § 10.31(a)(1)(ii) (2011).  Additionally, 
the relevant penalty provisions directly applicable to taxpayers reflect substantially the same 
certainty standards as well, and thus the advice that a practitioner will provide to a taxpayer about 
the certainty of a position will obviously be shaped in the context of instructing the taxpayer 
regarding his own penalty exposure.  26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2006). 
34. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(C) (2006).  Some commentators have advocated for adopting a 
“more likely than not” standard generally for all tax advice.  See Wells, supra note 13, at 645 
(explaining the “more likely than not” standard with regard to the Affordable Health Care for 
America Act). 
35. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(A) (2006), as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3880 
(2008).  The substantial authority standard is described in the relevant regulations as falling 
between the reasonable basis standard and the more likely than not standard.  26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-
4(d) (2012).  While assigning mathematical probabilities to such standards is fraught with peril, 
substantial authority has been pegged at roughly a 40% chance of success on the merits.  Linda 
M. Beale, Tax Advice before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying 
Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 594 n.27 (2006); Michael Doran, Tax Penalties 
and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 119 (2009); J. Timothy Philipps, It’s Not Easy 
Being Easy: Advising Tax Return Positions, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 589, 606 (1993); Burgess 
Raby & William Raby, “Reasonable Basis” v. Other Tax Opinion Standards, 73 TAX NOTES 
1209, 1209 (1996). 
36. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(B), as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3880 (2008).  
Reasonable basis is defined as “a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is, significantly 
higher than not frivolous or not patently improper.”  Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (as amended in 
6_LAVOIE 3/9/2013  1:36 PM 
2013] Am I My Brother’s Keeper? 825 
return preparer that violates these guidelines is subject to penalty.37  
Tax attorneys who do not meet the requirements of a return preparer 
may still find themselves in violation of the Government’s rules for 
practice before the Internal Revenue Service.38  In any event, an 
attorney violating these guidelines might be open to malpractice claims 
from his client.39  As a result, if an attorney firmly believes a client’s 
intended tax reporting of a transaction would violate these standards, it 
is unlikely that the attorney would continue to represent the client.40 
In many such cases, however, the decision regarding whether the 
relevant reporting standards would be violated is a close one.  In those 
situations, an attorney who views her role as a zealous advocate (or 
more cynically, whose economic interests are tied to allowing the client 
to proceed) might be more inclined to color her assessment of the 
transaction in the client’s favor.  This is where a strong gatekeeping 
ethical norm would encourage practitioners to hew to a more 
conservative view of the issue and thereby dissuade more questionable 
transactions at the margin.  But, should tax attorneys undertake such a 
gatekeeping function when doing so is arguably detrimental to their 
clients’ interests? 
B. Justifications for Tax Gatekeeping 
A number of arguments have been made to support a gatekeeping 
role for tax attorneys.  Some have reasoned that because taxes are used 
for the benefit of society and taxpayers have an interest in seeing that 
taxes are paid, the relationship between taxpayer and Government is not 
a truly adversarial one, and therefore the zealous advocacy norms that 
 
2003).  The regulations explain that it is not satisfied by a position that is “merely colorable” or 
“merely arguable”; however, if the position is based on one of the authorities set out in section 
1.6662–4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2003) of the Treasury Regulations (taking into account the 
relevance and persuasiveness of the authorities, and subsequent developments), the return 
position will generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard even though it may not satisfy the 
substantial authority standard.  Most commentators peg the reasonable basis standard as 
indicating an approximately 20% or greater chance of success on the merits.  See supra note 35 
and accompanying text. 
37. Section 6694 provides a penalty for a tax return or refund claim equal to the greater of 
$1,000 or 50% of the income derived by the return preparer from the subject return or claim.  26 
U.S.C. § 6694(a)(1). 
38. 31 C.F.R. § 10.31(a)(1)(ii) (2011).  See supra note 33 (discussing the extension of the 
return prepare standards to advice regarding a return position under Circular 230). 
39. Jay Soled, Tax Shelter Malpractice Cases and Their Implications for Tax Compliance, 58 
AM. U. L. REV. 267, 268–69 (2008). 
40. An attorney is generally permitted to withdraw from representing a client in a number of 
situations, including a situation where “the client insists upon taking action . . . with which the 
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) 
(2011).   
6_LAVOIE 3/9/2013  1:36 PM 
826 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
would apply to a normal civil controversy should not apply in the tax 
law setting.41  Others have noted that tax practitioners are subject to 
direct regulation by the Government,42 and can therefore be said to owe 
duties to the Government due to this special relationship.43  A crasser 
justification is that gatekeeping helps lawyers maintain their personal 
reputation vis-à-vis the Government and therefore gatekeeping is in 
their personal interest, as well as indirectly in the general interest of all 
their current and future clients.44   
However, the primary justification for a gatekeeping role in tax 
practice arises from the very nature of our tax system.  The hallmark of 
the U.S. income tax system is its self-assessment nature.45  That is, 
taxpayers determine how the tax law applies to their particular situation 
and then calculate and pay their tax liability accordingly.46  Taxpayers 
have the initial burden to apply the law correctly to their personal 
situations.  Indeed, in filing tax returns, taxpayers must affirm under 
penalties of perjury their belief that the return is “true, correct and 
 
41. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 16.  Of course, while this is true in the abstract, once any 
particular tax dispute arises, the specific taxpayer involved will either pay more or less depending 
on the outcome and therefore, at least in a controversy setting the relationship between the 
taxpayer and the Government, is fully as adversarial as in any other litigation.   
42. The Secretary of the Treasury has authority to regulate the conduct of, and to discipline, 
practitioners appearing before it.  31 U.S.C. § 330 (2006).  Pursuant to this authority, Circular 
230, codified at title 31, subtitle A, part 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, sets forth detailed 
rules governing practice before the IRS and establishes a Director of the Office of Professional 
Responsibility to implement them and monitor practitioner compliance.   
43. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 18.  Of course, Circular 230 technically only governs practice 
before the IRS.  Consequently, prior to 2004, some argued that these rules did not cover 
practitioners providing tax planning advice because practice before the IRS only covered audit 
defense, tax controversy work and other direct dealings with IRS personnel.  See, e.g., Ben Wang, 
Note, Supplying the Tax Shelter Industry: Contingent Fee Compensation for Accountants Spurs 
Production, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1266 (2003) (arguing that Circular 230 is limited in scope 
and does not apply to tax planning advice).  Therefore, any gatekeeping obligation arising from 
Circular 230 would be limited to those controversy-related contexts.  To address this issue, 
Congress added Subsection (d) to 31 U.S.C. § 330 to explicitly bring “written advice with respect 
to any entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement, which is of a type 
which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion” within the 
ambit of Circular 230.  Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 822(b), 118 Stat. 1418, 1587 (2004).  
Additionally, in 2005 Circular 230 was amended to provide “aspirational” best practices for 
practitioners providing tax advice generally.  31 C.F.R. § 10.33 (2011). 
44. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 27–28. 
45. See, e.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1957) (“Our system of taxation is 
based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint.”); Joseph J. Darby, 
Confidentiality and the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 577, 577 (1998) (“The United States 
enjoys what is quite probably the most successful tax collection system in the world.  It is based 
on the principle of voluntary self-assessment.”). 
46. Doran, supra note 35, at 113; Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The 
Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 176 (2004) 
[hereinafter Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law]. 
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complete.”47  Of course, our tax laws are complex and understanding 
them in concept, let alone how they apply and interrelate in a given fact 
pattern, is often unclear.  Consequently, taxpayers look to, and the 
efficient functioning of the tax system relies on, the advice of tax 
practitioners to guide them to the most appropriate interpretation of the 
law.  Note that the taxpayer has the legal duty to report her correct tax 
based on the facts and relevant law.48  Consequently, the goal of 
reporting the correct tax should also be the guiding principle for the tax 
adviser.49 
The gatekeeping responsibility of the tax lawyer is not just premised 
on helping the client meet the legal obligation of arriving at the correct 
tax, but also on the Government’s inability to adequately double-check 
each taxpayer’s initial tax determination.  Each year the Government 
can audit only a small fraction of all taxpayer returns.50  If taxpayers 
routinely report their taxes based on the most aggressive interpretation 
of the law, instead of an evenhanded one, then the fisc will be harmed.  
Further, as the magnitude of such aggressive reporting increases, it 
breeds disrespect for the law and encourages others to push the 
 
47. See, e.g., IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 1040 (2012), available at http://www. 
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf (illustrating the way in which taxpayers calculate their respective 
tax burdens); IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 1120 (2012), available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf (noting that U.S. Corporation Income Tax Returns require 
signature under penalty of perjury).  In addition to general perjury consequences, this jurat also 
subjects a taxpayer to potential felony prosecution if the taxpayer signs the jurat and “does not 
believe [the return] to be true and correct as to every material matter.”  26 U.S.C. § 7206 (2006). 
48. Breland v. United States, 323 F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1963) (stating that a taxpayer has the 
obligation “to keep books and records of his income for the purpose of determining the correct 
amount of income taxes due and payable”); United States v. Norton, 250 F.2d 902, 905 (5th Cir. 
1958) (“[The] duty to return and pay the correct tax rests on the taxpayer.”); Conforte v. Comm’r, 
74 T.C. 1160, 1178 (1980) (“[T]he self-assessment system place the responsibility of maintaining 
records and substantiating claimed deductions upon the taxpayer.”).  Of course, reasonable minds 
might differ regarding the extent to which a taxpayer can resolve legal uncertainties in her own 
favor in arriving at a decision regarding her “correct” tax liability.  See, e.g., Calvin Johnson, 
“True And Correct:” Standards for Tax Return Reporting, 43 TAX NOTES 1521, 1522–30  (1989) 
(considering various legislative proposals to clarify taxpayer positions and supporting self-
assessment); Beale, supra note 35, at 594 (noting “the ambiguity of the existing rules regarding 
taxpayer’s obligation” to report their income and tax liabilities).   
49. See Myron C. Grauer, What’s Wrong with This Picture?: The Tension between Analytical 
Premises and Appropriate Standards for Tax Practitioners, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1991) 
(opining that a practitioner’s duties derive from taxpayers’ duty to file true and correct tax 
returns); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Counseling Ordered Liberty: Reply to a Commentary, 9 VA. 
TAX REV. 781, 781–86 (1990) (explaining that a practitioner’s reporting position obligations are 
derivative of the client’s duties to comply with the tax laws). 
50. Only 0.9% of all tax returns were subjected to audit in the Government’s 2011 fiscal year.  
IRS, 2011 DATA BOOK 22 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/11databk.pdf. 
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envelope.51  This byproduct would be a weight our tax system could not 
bear. 
Moreover, when tax practitioners are involved in planning 
transactions or assisting taxpayers in developing their reporting 
positions for a completed transaction, it is questionable whether such 
work is truly adversarial, as that term has traditionally been interpreted.  
Our adversarial system of justice contemplates a competition among 
equals that is intended to efficiently and fairly yield the “truth.”52  Thus, 
having a taxpayer make colorable arguments regarding his proper tax 
burden is justifiable once the issue has been joined with the Government 
(either administratively or in litigation), but making those identical 
claims on an initial tax return, when no adversary has yet entered the 
ring, impedes the arrival at a fair result. 
As one commentator noted: 
[The] fundamental role of tax practitioners [is] to identify for 
taxpayers those tax return positions that may be attempted and those 
that are beyond the pale . . . .  In a real sense, the tax adviser is a 
gatekeeper who regulates the flow of issues into the system . . . .  For 
self-assessment to be workable, tax advisers cannot fail to perform 
their gatekeeper function and cannot allow a floodtide of illegitimate 
issues to swamp the system.  Accordingly, it is imperative that tax 
advisers apply professional standards with intellectual honesty in 
determining what positions have enough credibility to be able to be 
asserted.53 
Of course, determining exactly how weak a position must be to trigger 
this gatekeeper intervention is a highly relevant question that has been 
the subject of much debate.  But defining the relevant threshold is a 
question intellectually distinct from whether there should be a 
gatekeeping obligation at all.  
C. Arguments against Tax Gatekeeping 
Although the existence of a tax gatekeeping obligation has 
traditionally been acknowledged by many in the tax bar,54 there has 
 
51. Lavoie, Taxpaying Ethos, supra note 18, at 655–60. 
52. Edward F. Barrett, The Adversary System and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 479, 479–80 (1962). 
53. Green, supra note 9, at 1692–93. 
54. BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 9, § 101.2; Mortimer M. Caplin, Responsibilities 
of the Tax Advisor—A Perspective, 40 TAXES 1030, 1032 (1962); Frederic G. Corneel, Guidelines 
to Tax Practice Second, 43 TAX LAW. 297, 301–02 (1990); Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer’s 
Professional Responsibility, 39 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1028, 1031 n.9, 1050 n.81 (1987); Linda 
Galler, The Tax Lawyer’s Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681, 687–98 (1997) (reviewing 
BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1995)); Anthony 
C. Infanti, Eyes Wide Shut: Surveying Erosion in the Professionalism of the Tax Bar, 22 VA. TAX 
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always been a segment of the bar that rejected this proposition,55 
including some very well-known tax lawyers.56  While there are 
variations of degree, the primary argument against a gatekeeping role 
for tax attorneys is grounded in the zealous advocacy norm.  At the 
extreme, some have expressed libertarian fears of the Government 
acting as “Big Brother” through attorneys being required to report on 
their own clients.57  For others, the rejection of any gatekeeping role has 
arisen from blind allegiance to the concept that the role of a lawyer is 
purely to serve his client’s interests without any moral judgment.58 
Others have viewed any weakening of a strong zealous advocacy 
norm as holding out the prospect of creating intolerable conflicts of 
interest between attorneys and their clients due to the attorney’s 
competing obligation to the Government.59  A more nuanced version of 
this claim is that a client’s knowledge of his attorney’s dual obligations 
would make the client less forthcoming with underlying facts and 
 
REV. 589, 606 (2003); John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer’s Tax Practice, 13 
TAX L. REV. 27, 36 (1957); Francis C. Oatway, Motivation and Responsibility in Tax Practice: 
The Need for Definition, 20 TAX L. REV. 237, 254 (1965); Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging the 
Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 715 (1997); 
Schenk, supra note 9, at 2005; David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 338 
(2006); Thomas N. Tarleau, Ethical Problems in Dealing with Treasury Representatives, 8 TAX 
L. REV. 10, 11 (1952); Randolph W. Thrower, Preserving the Integrity of the Federal Tax 
System, 33 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 707, 709–10 (1975); Johnnie M. Walters, Ethical and 
Professional Responsibilities of Tax Practitioners, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 23, 24–26 (1981); Ann 
Southworth, Note, Redefining the Attorney’s Role in Abusive Tax Shelters, 37 STAN. L. REV. 889, 
891, 908–12, 918 (1985).   
55. See, e.g., Mark Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to his 
Client and to the Government?—The Theory, 15 U.S.C. INST. ON FED. TAX’N 25 (1963) (arguing 
that a tax attorney’s primary responsibility is owed to his or her client); Moraine, supra note 11, 
at 190 (noting controversy over whether tax lawyers have a gatekeeping function); Camilla E. 
Watson, Legislating Morality: The Duty to the Tax System Reconsidered, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1197 
(2003) [hereinafter Watson, Duty Reconsidered] (opining that if there is a duty to the tax system, 
clear normative expectations are necessary); Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical 
Obligations, and the Duty to the System, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847, 851, 871, 909 (1999) (arguing 
that there is “no discrete duty owed by the lawyer qua lawyer either to society or to the tax 
system”). 
56. E.g., Boris I. Bittker, Professional Responsibility and the Preparation of Federal Income 
Tax Returns, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 245, 270 (Boris I. 
Bittker ed., 1970); Randolph E. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Advisor, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 
412, 429 (1953). 
57. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 22. 
58. Rick Taylor, Rusty Pipes Is Simply Rusty, Says Tax Practitioner, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 
11, 1994, LEXIS 94 TNT 135–46 (“I will do everything that I can to be absolutely certain that my 
clients do not pay one dime more tax than is absolutely required!  That is what I was trained to do 
and that is what my clients pay me to do.  To accuse me or anyone else in the tax community of 
not “playing fair” and to demand that I somehow overlook planning ideas in the name of morals 
is, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, ‘mere cant.’”). 
59. Moraine, supra note 11, at 190. 
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motivations.  As a result the lawyer’s legal advice would be skewed.  At 
the extreme clients concerned about the dual obligations might not seek 
legal advice at all.60  Weakening the zealous advocacy norm, even in a 
planning context, undermines the bedrock taxpayer compliance required 
for the self-assessment system to function.61  Intriguingly, this argument 
contains an internal contradiction.  The argument maintains that a 
gatekeeping role will dissuade taxpayers from seeking legal advice (or 
hiding the true facts when seeking advice) and, as a result, taxpayers 
will take unjustified positions.  The implication is that, in the absence of 
a gatekeeping obligation, taxpayers would get full, unfettered, pro-
taxpayer advice, and yet the taxpayers would take fewer unjustified 
positions.  Why would that be the case unless the presence of the 
attorney in fact did dissuade unwarranted taxpayer positions, implicitly 
recognizing that the attorneys must be performing at least some 
gatekeeping despite their purported zealous advocacy? 
The interesting commonality between the traditional arguments for 
and against a gatekeeper role is that both sets of arguments largely 
devolve into a debate about the scope of the zealous advocacy norm and 
its appropriateness outside of a litigation or controversy context.62  
 
60. Johnson, supra note 56, at 30–31. 
61. Id. at 30. 
62. The theoretical underpinnings of the zealous advocacy norm have been the subject of 
extensive commentary since the 1970s.  David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV. 673, 
673 (2012).  An important contribution of this literature was the identification of three defining 
characteristics of the adversary system: (1) partisanship (zealously making all available 
arguments for your client); (2) neutrality (without regard to moral implications or possible injury 
to others); and (3) nonaccountability (and without moral censure to the attorney for doing so).  Id. 
at 673–74.  Identifying these factors led directly to observations regarding the central importance 
of having an independent arbiter involved as part of the adversary system.  Murray L. Schwartz, 
The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 677–78 (1978).  This 
insight prompted serious questions regarding the appropriateness of adhering to a zealous 
advocacy norm (and the concomitant lack of moral responsibility on behalf of attorneys) in 
contexts where an independent arbiter was lacking.  LUBAN, supra note 3; Stephen L. Pepper, The 
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 613; Schwartz, supra, at 677–78.  In recent years this discussion of the proper 
role of zealous advocacy outside traditional adversary system contexts has continued.  See 
generally TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENSE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION 
OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE (2009) (arguing in favor of the use of zealous advocacy as a generally 
applicable norm); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010) (arguing that, 
beyond traditional adversarial proceedings, attorneys should moderate zealous advocacy to 
uphold their duty to fairly apply the relevant law); Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the 
Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389, 391–93 (2005) (developing a conflict of 
interest approach for resolving situations where an attorney’s moral instincts run counter to his 
client’s); Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 
496 (2011) (recasting questions regarding the role of the adversary system in jurisprudential, 
rather than moral terms); Wendel, supra note 3, at 1169–70 (arguing that outside of traditional 
adversary settings attorneys should temper zealous advocacy norms in favor of upholding a duty 
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Those resisting a special gatekeeping obligation for tax practitioners 
often ground their opposition in part on the premise that the ethical 
obligations of attorneys should be the same regardless of their field.63  
As discussed earlier, this Article, and the recent evolution in legal ethics 
generally, favor the contrary position: that it is appropriate to modify 
the zealous advocacy norm in non-adversarial contexts.64  Thus, the 
traditional arguments against a specific tax gatekeeping duty are weaker 
today than was true historically; the perception of the lawyer’s role in 
non-adversarial contexts generally has undergone a transformation. 
D. The Practical Approach 
Beyond those actively arguing whether tax lawyers have a 
gatekeeping duty, a third segment of the tax bar has historically taken 
the position that the entire question is merely a matter of academic 
interest.65  That is, the general obligation of taxpayers to file a correct 
return and other specific Government rules regarding factual disclosures 
by taxpayers and their representatives are sufficient to ensure taxpayer 
compliance with the self-assessment system without any need to imply 
any additional duty on tax practitioners.66  Further, some have argued 
that as a matter of practical lawyering, most tax advisors would counsel 
their clients to act prudently in any event, whether or not any specific 
gatekeeping obligation actually existed.  As one commentator stated: 
[Y]ou are never really up against the gun to determine whether the 
practitioner does have dual responsibilities [to his client and to the 
government], but that it is just good business for you, for the client 
and for the government to try to minimize adversary aspects just as 
much as possible, and to increase the disclosure aspects just as much 
as possible, and thereby to improve relationships among the three of 
you as much as possible. . . .  [It is a] mere academic exercise when 
we discuss the degree to which there is this dual relationship . . . [but] 
it is in our best interest to act as if there were a dual responsibility.67 
Thus, as a practical matter, through the mid-1960s, many tax attorneys 
implicitly exercised a gatekeeping function, irrespective of whether they 
acknowledged an actual ethical obligation to do so. 
 
to the fair application of the relevant body of law). 
63. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 22–24. 
64. See supra notes 2–3. 
65. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 27–28. 
66. Id. at 31–32. 
67. Id. at 27. 
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II. THE DECLINE OF TAX GATEKEEPING 
A. The Rise of Lawyer-Facilitated Tax Shelter Activity 
The tax bar’s prevailing gatekeeping norm began to noticeably 
weaken with the wave of tax shelters focused on individual taxpayers 
that swept the country in the 1970s, and then dissipated further with the 
wave of corporate tax shelters that occurred in the 1990s.  Both periods 
were characterized by the use of legal opinions to bless highly 
aggressive tax avoidance transactions.68  In each situation, the tax bar 
was unable, or unwilling, to stem the tax shelter tide.  This failure 
resulted in increased regulation of tax opinion practice by the 
Government, as well as changes to the statutory penalty provisions 
applicable to taxpayers.  These tax shelter waves provide stark evidence 
of the abdication of the traditional gatekeeping function by a significant 
portion of the tax bar. 
1. The Tax Shelters of the 1970s 
Up through 1965, the prevailing (although by no means monolithic) 
position of the tax bar, as evidenced by the commentary of the time and 
actual prudent practice, was to endorse a gatekeeping function.69  In 
1965, the American Bar Association (ABA) Ethics Committee, in 
Formal Opinion 314 (“1965 Opinion”), seriously challenged this 
prevailing ethical norm.70  The 1965 Opinion took the position that, 
since disputes with the Government regarding a taxpayer’s tax liability 
were adversarial, and the taxpayer’s filing of a tax return was the first 
step in any ultimate dispute, a lawyer ethically should resolve doubts in 
favor of the client in pre-return tax planning.71  Further, the 1965 
Opinion refused to treat the Government as a “tribunal” to which a 
higher duty of disclosure would be required.72  The bottom line 
assessment in the 1965 Opinion was that a lawyer could ethically advise 
a client to take any position without any highlighting disclosure as long 
 
68. See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Tax Shelter Opinions Threatened the Tax System in 
the 1970s, 111 TAX NOTES 947 (2006) (describing the role of tax opinions in the tax shelters of 
the 1970s and 1980s); Rostain, supra note 11, at 92–94 (describing the use of tax opinions in the 
tax shelter transactions of the 1990s and 2000s).  
69. See generally Hatfield, supra note 8 (describing legal ethics writings by tax lawyers 
promoting the gatekeeping function).  
70. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965), reprinted in 51 A.B.A. J. 671 
(1965). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. At the time of the 1965 Opinion, the relevant ethical canons contained heightened 
ethical rules regarding certain disclosures and other matters applicable to attorney interactions 
with the courts.  For the analogous modern rules regarding candor toward tribunals, see MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2011).  
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as there was a “reasonable basis” for the position.73  In reaching its 
conclusion, the 1965 Opinion completely ignored the reality of the self-
assessment system and the taxpayer’s legal obligation to report their 
correct tax liability.  Given the low Government audit rate, a lawyer’s 
advice to take an extreme tax return position without specific disclosure 
to the Government would most often result in a de facto final 
determination that the position was correct, rather than merely 
indicating that the position would not be considered fraudulent or 
frivolous by a court in litigation.74  Despite its logical flaws, the 1965 
Opinion was in line with the popular conception,75 including that of the 
courts,76 of tax law interpretation as a completely objective economic 
 
73. Formal Op. 314, supra note 70.  While the “reasonable basis” standard was not 
specifically quantified in the 1965 Opinion, and arguably may have been misinterpreted by some 
then-practitioners, over time the accepted view has become that a “reasonable basis” reflects 
approximately a 20% chance of success on the merits.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a)(2)(B) (2006) 
(providing the reasonable basis standard for disclosed positions). 
74. Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA. TAX REV. 77, 
91–93 (1989). 
75. See, e.g., Legal Tax-Dodging Upheld by Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1937, at 27 (noting 
J.P. Morgan’s statements that “taxation is a legal question . . . not a moral one” and that 
“Congress should know how to levy taxes and if it doesn’t know how to collect them, then a man 
is a fool to pay the taxes”).  To see that this sentiment retains currency today, one need merely 
note the reaction of the 2012 Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, who responded to a 
question regarding his personal tax situation as follows: “My view is I have paid all the taxes 
required by law.  I don’t pay more than are legally due and, frankly, if I had paid more than are 
legally due I don’t think I’d be qualified to become president.  I’d think people would want me to 
follow the law and pay only what the tax code requires.”  Transcript: ABC News’ David Muir 
Interviews Mitt Romney, ABC NEWS (July 29, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-
david-muir-interview-mitt-romney/story?id=16881787#.UF-0w42PWSo. 
76. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) (“The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease 
the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the 
law permits, cannot be doubted.”); Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930) 
(“The only purpose of the vendor here was to escape taxation . . . .  The fact that it desired to 
evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the very meaning of a line in the law is that 
you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it.”); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 
240 U.S. 625, 630–31 (1916) (“[W]hen the law draws a line, a case is on one side of it or the 
other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party has availed himself to the full 
of what the law permits.  When an act is condemned as an evasion what is meant is that it is on 
the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the mere letter of the law.”); Comm’r 
v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting) (“Over and over again 
courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low 
as possible.  Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to 
pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions.  To 
demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.”); Helvering v. Comm’r, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d 
Cir. 1934) (“[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its 
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose [sic], to evade, taxation.  
Any one [sic] may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound 
to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to 
increase one’s taxes.”), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
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calculus imbued with no moral, ethical, or societal considerations.77  
Similarly, the pro-taxpayer stance in the 1965 Opinion coincided with a 
decrease in certain broader societal norms that had acted as a 
counterbalance to this amoral approach to taxpaying obligations.78 
The reasonable basis standard set forth in the 1965 Opinion became 
the accepted standard used by tax practitioners in providing tax return 
advice for the next twenty years.79  Tax shelter activity exploded during 
this period.80  These tax shelters typically involved creating investment 
vehicles that promised investors large tax benefits.81  Typically, the 
claimed tax benefits for the investments were justified based on tax 
opinions provided by tax lawyers involved in developing the underlying 
investment transaction.82  Unfortunately for all involved, these opinions 
typically did not forthrightly address the relevant law, were based on 
 
77. For a defense of using patriotic and moral justifications in favor of tax compliance efforts, 
see Richard Lavoie, Patriotism and Taxation: The Tax Compliance Implications of the Tea Party 
Movement, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 39 (2011). 
78. For instance, the Great Depression, and tax protests in the early 1930s, prompted national 
and local “pay your taxes” campaigns initiated by various interested parties to boost compliance 
at a time of great budgetary and national strain.  See DAVID T. BEITO, TAXPAYERS IN REVOLT: 
TAX RESISTANCE DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION 101–29 (1989) (describing the effect of the 
“pay-your-taxes” movement in response to the Chicago tax strike).  Similarly, during World War 
II, the United States went so far as to have Walt Disney produce a cartoon featuring Donald Duck 
as a reluctant taxpayer who is ultimately swayed to pay his taxes in order to help defeat the Axis 
powers.  Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of 
the Income Tax during World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 716 (1989).  Finally, in the postwar 
period, prominent lawyers highlighted patriotic reasons for paying taxes in order to support the 
Government, asserting it was a vital component in the effort to defeat the communist threat to 
capitalism.  Hatfield, supra note 8, at 11–13.  However, as the Cold War dragged on (eventually 
giving way to détente) and the public became disenchanted with the personal and financial toll of 
the Vietnam War, these societal forces (i.e., patriotic sentiment engendered by World War II and 
the Cold War) supporting tax adherence began to weaken. 
79. It was not until 1985 that the ABA modified the reasonable basis standard out of concern 
that some practitioners were interpreting it to be a lower level of certitude than intended.  ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), reprinted in 39 TAX 
LAW. 631, 631 (1986) (“The Committee is informed that the standard of ‘reasonable basis’ has 
been construed by many lawyers to support the use of any colorable claim on a tax return to 
justify exploitation of the lottery of the tax return audit selection process.  This view is not 
universally held, and the Committee does not believe that the reasonable basis standard, properly 
interpreted and applied, permits this construction.”). 
80. George K. Yin, Getting Serious about Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from 
History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209, 210–15 (2001) (describing generally the scope of the tax shelter 
problem in the 1970s and 1980s). 
81. Often these were real estate investment partnerships exploiting the use of nonrecourse debt 
financing made possible by a 1947 Supreme Court decision.  See Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1 
(1947).  See also Christian C. Day, Commissioner v. Tufts: The Fall of Footnote 37; The 
Confirmation of The Functional Relationship, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 803 (1984).   
82. James Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions 314, 346 
and Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 212–17 (1985) (illustrating the syndicated tax shelters of 
the period and the role of tax opinions in facilitating these transactions). 
6_LAVOIE 3/9/2013  1:36 PM 
2013] Am I My Brother’s Keeper? 835 
incorrect factual assumptions, or failed to actually state the likelihood of 
success if the transaction were questioned by the Government.83  While 
the number of tax attorneys actually involved in drafting such opinions 
and promoting these tax shelters was relatively small, the broader tax 
bar failed to effectively dissuade both their colleagues from engaging in 
this activity and the public from pursuing these aggressive 
transactions.84 
As a result of the failure of the tax bar to effectively curtail the 
creation and use of these tax shelter opinions, the Government was 
forced to intervene more directly.  In the early 1980s, to address certain 
aspects of the tax shelter problem, the Government proposed, and 
ultimately adopted in modified form, specific provisions of Circular 230 
regulating the content of tax opinions used in these tax shelter 
transactions;85 enacted various tax penalty provisions;86 sanctioned 
increased disclosure, reporting and procedural requirements;87 and 
passed numerous substantive changes to the tax law.88  Similarly, courts 
 
83. Id.  See also SPECIAL COMM. ON THE LAWYER’S ROLE IN TAX PRACTICE, THE ASS’N OF 
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., THE LAWYER’S ROLE IN TAX PRACTICE (1983), reprinted in 36 
TAX LAW. 865 (1982–1983) (depicting generally the tax lawyer’s role in syndicating tax 
shelters). 
84. While the investments made by individuals in these syndicated tax shelters often would 
not be of sufficient magnitude to warrant investors seeking an independent opinion on the tax 
consequences, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (revised) 
(1982), reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 471, 471 (1982), one would have expected the organized bar to 
take a more public stand regarding this type of shelter activity.  While the bar ultimately did act to 
provide guidance in Formal Opinion 346, id., that opinion came only after many years of 
tolerating this type of tax shelter activity and only after the Government had proposed 
amendments to Circular 230 to directly regulate practitioner behavior that the bar felt were overly 
strict.  See Tax Shelters; Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 58, 594 
(1980) (proposed Aug. 29, 1980) (proposing standards for providing opinions promoting tax 
shelters); Holden, supra note 82, at 217–18 (describing proposals requiring practitioners to 
exercise due diligence and issue favorable overall opinions). 
85. While the Government’s initially proposed amendments to Circular 230 were viewed by 
many practitioners as too strict, the changes ultimately adopted ended up instead as essentially 
codifying the core ethical standards the bar had adopted in Formal Opinion 346.  Holden, supra 
note 82, at 222–24; Amendments to Circular 230, 49 Fed. Reg. 6719 (1984) (reporting final 
regulations). 
86. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6659 (2006) (valuation overstatement penalty); 26 U.S.C. § 6661 
(2006) (the substantial understatement penalty); 26 U.S.C. § 6700 (2006) (penalty for promoting 
abusive tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6707–6708 (2006) (penalty for failing to furnish information 
regarding tax shelters). 
87. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6045(e) (2006) (real estate transaction reporting); 26 U.S.C. § 6111 
(2006) (promoter registration of tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. § 6112 (2006) (maintenance of investor 
lists by organizers and sellers of tax shelters); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6221–6231 (2006) (partnership audit 
rules); 26 U.S.C. § 7408 (2006) (injunctive action against promoters of abusive tax shelters). 
88. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1250 (2006) (depreciation recapture rules); 26 U.S.C. § 704(b) 
(2006) (partnership allocation rules); 26 U.S.C. § 163(d) (2006) (investment interest limitations); 
26 U.S.C. § 465 (2006) (at-risk loss limit rules); 26 U.S.C. §§ 1092, 1256 (2006) (straddle rules). 
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actively fought against such tax shelter activity.89  While this type of tax 
shelter activity dissipated in the years following these changes, their 
contribution to that result is unclear since it appears that an unrelated 
statutory change—the adoption of the passive activity loss rules in 
198690—was the primary factor in the demise of this type of tax shelter 
activity.91 
2. The Tax Shelters of the 1990s 
Contemporaneously with the widespread tax shelter activity in the 
1970s and early 1980s, there was a marked decline in practitioner 
adherence to the 1965 Opinion’s reasonable basis tax reporting 
standard.92  As a result, the ABA revisited the question of the proper tax 
reporting certitude standard and adopted Formal Opinion 85-352 of the 
ABA’s Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (“1985 
Opinion”).93  The 1985 Opinion restated the relevant ethical standard 
for an attorney to counsel a tax return position as one that had “some 
realistic possibility” of success if litigated.94  While this standard was 
somewhat higher than the former reasonable basis benchmark, its 
underlying premise was essentially the same as that of the 1965 
Opinion.  Both opinions considered filing tax returns as an aspect of the 
adversarial process and gave no serious consideration to the very 
different context between an actually joined adversarial proceeding and 
the mere filing of a tax return, especially in light of the necessarily low 
 
89. See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Comm’r, 544 F.2d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting 
taxpayer’ deductions); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583–84 (1978) (holding 
that financial transaction cannot solely be shaped by tax avoidance); Hilton v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 
305, 369 (1980) (holding taxpayers could not deduct their distributive partnership losses), aff’d 
per curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982); Comm’r v. Tufts, 
461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (disallowing taxpayers to deduct certain partnership property); 
Odend’hal v. Comm’r, 748 F.2d 908, 913–14 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that taxpayers could deduct 
interest only to the extent of their property income); Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm’r, 752 
F.2d 89, 96 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that sham transactions do not entitle taxpayer to depreciate 
deductions). 
90. See 26 U.S.C. § 469 (2006). 
91. See Yin, supra note 80, at 218–20; Christine Rucinski Strong & Susan Pace Hamill, 
Allocations Attributable to Partner Nonrecourse Liabilities: Issues Revealed by LLCs and LLPs, 
51 ALA. L. REV. 603, 607 (2000). 
92. Holden, supra note 82, at 235. 
93. Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 79. 
94. Id.  Since most tax advice and tax opinion work by practitioners would not fall within the 
specific strictures of the syndicated tax shelter rules then embodied in Formal Opinion 346 and 
Circular 230, the “realistic possibility” certitude level set forth in the 1985 Opinion became the 
primary ethical consideration for practitioners following its adoption.  David Weisbach & Brian 
Gale, The Regulation of Tax Advice and Advisers, 130 TAX NOTES 1279, 1285 (2011).  Phrased 
in terms of percentages, a realistic possibility of success was considered to represent a 33% 
chance of success on the merits.  See authorities cited in supra note 35. 
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Government audit rate and the intended functioning of the self-
assessment system.95  Thus, the relevant ethical guideline applicable to 
tax practitioners in planning situations was only marginally higher in 
the post-1985 period than it had previously been.96 
Similarly, while the 1980s heralded some changes in the civil 
penalties faced by taxpayers, the basic penalty structure remained one 
that left significant room for taxpayers and their legal advisors to 
undertake aggressive tax-motivated transactions.  In rendering planning 
advice in the early 1990s, a tax lawyer primarily needed to consider 
only whether the proposed transaction would expose the client to either 
a negligence penalty97 or a substantial understatement penalty.98  As a 
general matter, a taxpayer could avoid both of these penalties if he 
obtained and relied in good faith on an opinion of counsel supporting 
the claimed position.99  If the underlying transaction giving rise to the 
claimed tax benefit was one in which “the” principal purpose was the 
evasion or avoidance of tax—a “tax shelter” under federal law100—then 
the opinion as a practical matter needed to find that the position was 
more likely than not correct.101  However, since a tax shelter for 
purposes of the substantial understatement penalty only existed when 
the tax motive exceeded that of any other motive, transactions with 
business or profitmaking purposes would generally not be covered by 
this more likely than not standard.  In those cases, a taxpayer avoided 
any penalty for taking the position so long as “substantial authority” 
existed for the position.102  In non-tax shelter situations where 
 
95. Durst, supra note 54, at 1047. 
96. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 470 (2008); 
Soled, supra note 39, at 291; Beale, supra note 35, at 628–29. 
97. Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(1) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-3.  The negligence penalty 
was inapplicable as long as a reasonable basis existed for the taxpayer’s position (or a realistic 
possibility of success existed if the position was directly contrary to certain published authorities).   
98. Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(b)(2) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4.  The substantial 
understatement penalty became applicable once an underpayment surpassed a threshold level, but, 
as discussed below, could be avoided if the taxpayer had “substantial authority” for his reporting 
position or if the position was adequately disclosed (provided a tax shelter transaction was not 
involved). 
99. This was true both due to the operation of the specific penalty provisions and due to an 
overarching “reasonable cause” exception under then section 6664.  That section provided that no 
penalty would be applied to a taxpayer that was found, based on all the facts and circumstances, 
to have made a good faith effort to determine his proper tax liability (which could be shown by 
reasonable reliance on an opinion of counsel). 
100. Former 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C); former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4(g)(2). 
101. Technically, to avoid the penalty if a tax shelter was involved, the taxpayer need to show 
(1) that “substantial authority” existed for the position, and (2) that the taxpayer had a reasonable 
belief that the position taken was “more likely than not” correct.  Id.  A taxpayer’s reasonable 
belief could be premised on a tax opinion stating a more likely than not conclusion.  Id.   
102. If no tax shelter were involved, then the substantial underpayment penalty would be 
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substantial authority was ultimately found lacking, the taxpayer could 
often escape penalty due to reliance on a tax opinion finding that 
substantial authority existed.103 
Thus, at the start of the 1990s, a tax practitioner could ethically 
counsel in favor of taking any position for which there was a realistic 
possibility of success.  In some cases, however, the adviser would also 
have to alert the client to the need for disclosure of the position to 
eliminate the risk of penalties.  Further, by supplying the client with a 
tax opinion at a substantial authority level, or in tax shelter situations at 
a more likely than not level, the tax practitioner could effectively 
insulate the client from potential civil penalties for taking the position.  
This was the ethical and statutory backdrop for the wave of tax shelter 
activity that occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Unlike the prior era of tax shelters, which focused on syndicating tax 
loss transactions to individual taxpayers based largely on abusing the 
non-recourse debt rules, the new wave of tax shelters was developed to 
exploit a wide variety of vagaries in the tax law and then confidentially 
marketed to corporations and wealthy individuals as tax savings 
templates that could be readily adapted to the particular client’s 
situation.104  The two periods were similar, though, in that aggressive 
tax opinions and advisors played a central role in both creating and 
failing to impede these aggressive transactions.  Again, in the face of 
the bar’s unwillingness or inability to regulate its own behavior, the 
Government was forced to intercede with specific rules regulating the 
furnishing of tax planning advice and significant changes to the civil 
penalty provisions applicable to taxpayers. 
The Government significantly expanded the rules in Circular 230 
regarding written tax advice well beyond the narrow rules applicable to 
the syndication tax opinions of concern in the 1970s and 1980s.  Today, 
Circular 230 contains detailed guidelines governing a wide variety of 
 
inapplicable as long as either (1) substantial authority existed for the position, or (2) the position 
was non-frivolous and it was adequately disclosed on the tax return.  Former 26 U.S.C. § 
6662(b)(2) and former 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-4.  While a tax opinion concluding that substantial 
authority existed obviously would not be conclusive regarding whether substantial authority 
actually did exist, the taxpayer’s reasonable reliance on such an opinion would generally allow 
him to escape a penalty under the good faith exception of section 6664 even if the tax opinion 
turned out to be incorrect.  
103. Weisbach & Gale, supra note 94, at 1288.  See also supra note 99 (discussing the 
reasonable cause exception). 
104. See generally Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers, supra note 11, at 49–50; Joseph 
Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775, 1777 (1999); U.S. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS 
(1999). 
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written advice provided in tax planning situations.105  These rules were 
specifically intended to “send a strong message to tax professionals 
considering selling a questionable product to clients” and to “rein in 
practitioners who disregard their ethical obligations.”106  Generally, the 
core requirements of these new rules for covered opinions are that tax 
advisors must be more vigilant in their factual inquiries, forthrightly 
deal with all the legal issues,107 and explicitly reach a conclusion that 
the proposed tax treatment of an issue is at least more likely than not 
correct or, if there is only a lesser confidence level, explicitly disclose 
that the taxpayer cannot rely on the opinion for penalty protection 
purposes on that issue.108 
In tandem with its direct regulation of practitioners’ written tax 
advice, the Government also made numerous changes in the relevant 
civil penalty provisions applicable to taxpayers.  In general, these 
changes were aimed at making it more difficult for taxpayers to avoid 
penalties.109  This goal was accomplished by increasing the certainty 
levels required to avoid the penalties, as well as by making it more 
difficult to use reliance on a tax opinion as a basis for exception from a 
penalty.110  For instance, while the baseline requirement today for 
avoiding a substantial understatement penalty on non-tax shelter 
positions remains a substantial authority confidence level, the definition 
of “tax shelter” has been significantly expanded to include any plan or 
 
105. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.35–10.37 (2011).  The main rules related to “covered opinions.”  A 
covered opinion is defined as any written advice regarding: (1) any transaction that is the same or 
substantially similar to abusive transactions specifically identified by the Government in 
published guidance (“listed transactions”),; (2) any plan or arrangement where “the” principal 
purpose is tax avoidance or evasion, and most importantly; (3) any plan or arrangement where “a 
significant” purpose is tax avoidance or evasion if the opinion (a) expresses at least a more likely 
than not assessment on any issue in favor of the taxpayer (a “reliance opinion”), (b) is one the 
advisor knows, or has reason to know, will be used by the client or others to promote or market a 
transaction to taxpayers (a “marketed opinion”), or (c) is issued in conjunction with the adviser (i) 
agreeing to refund a portion of his fees if the taxpayer’s reporting position is not sustained or (ii) 
imposing a confidentiality requirement on the client.  31 C.F.R. § 10.35.  Written advice not 
qualifying as a covered opinion is more lightly regulated under section 10.37.  
106. IR-2004-152, 2004 IRB LEXIS 521 (I.R.S. Dec. 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=132445,00.html. (quoting then IRS Commissioner Mark W. 
Everson). 
107. “Significant purpose” transactions can be limited to an examination of only certain 
issues, but market, listed, and principal purpose opinions must deal with all relevant tax issues. 
108. For a more detailed review and explanation of the current Circular 230 rules on written 
tax advice, see David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First 
Amendment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 843, 850–67 (2006); Weisbach & Gale, supra note 94, at 1285–87. 
109. Weisbach & Gale, supra note 94, at 1288. 
110. Id. at 1288–89. 
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arrangement with a significant tax avoidance or evasion purpose.111  If a 
substantial understatement of tax relates to such a tax shelter, then the 
penalty applies, despite the existence of substantial authority, unless the 
taxpayer can satisfy the general reasonable cause exception of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6664.112  However, some uncertainty exists regarding the exact 
circumstances under which the reasonable cause exception is still 
available because the relevant regulations under section 6664 have not 
been updated to provide guidance regarding how the reasonable cause 
standard is to be applied to understatements on individual tax returns 
following the various amendments to section 6662.113 
Finally, as in the 1980s, the Government and the courts moved to 
strike at the underlying nature of the tax schemes.  In the 1980s this was 
accomplished through a wide variety of Governmental actions and court 
decisions.114  In combating the more recent wave of tax shelters, the 
response included, inter alia, creating a new tax return schedule 
requiring certain corporations to specifically disclose uncertain tax 
positions,115 codifying the economic substance doctrine (a judicial 
doctrine whose operation was previously subject to debate),116 and 
courts utilizing common law anti-abuse concepts to strike down 
aggressive transactions.117 
Following these Government and judicial actions, the latest wave of 
tax shelter activity seems to have subsided.118  Nevertheless, while 
insufficient gatekeeping by the tax bar clearly contributed to the growth 
of such shelters, it is impossible to quantify the impact of the 
 
111. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (2006). 
112. Additionally, if the transaction is found to lack economic substance (within the meaning 
of 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o) (2006)) then the reasonable cause exception under section 6664 becomes 
inapplicable.  Further, for certain reportable transactions incurring penalties under section 6662A, 
the requirements under section 6664 for showing reasonable cause are heightened.  26 U.S.C. § 
6664(d) (2006). 
113. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6664-4 (2011). 
114. See supra notes 86–90. 
115. See IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FORM 1120 SCHEDULE UTP (2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120utp.pdf.  
116. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o). 
117. See ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 253 (3d Cir. 1998); ASA Investerings P’ship 
v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 325 (1998), aff’d, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Black & Decker, 
436 F.3d 431, 441–43 (4th Cir. 2006); Coltec Indus. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 241 (2d Cir. 2006); Jade Trading, 
LLC v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 487, 491–93 (2005); Long Term Capital Holdings v. United 
States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 171 n.68 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x 40, 2005-2 U.S.T.C. P 
50,575 (2d Cir. 2005). 
118. Simon, supra note 9, at 1072; Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can the Partnership 
Anti-Abuse Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 461 (2010); 
Calvin H. Johnson & Lawrence Zelenak, Codification of General Disallowance of Artificial 
Losses, 122 TAX NOTES 1389, 1391 (2009). 
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Government’s increased direct regulation of tax practitioners in the 
waning use of these tax shelters. 
B. Factors Contributing to Weakened Gatekeeping 
The foregoing discussion demonstrated that while a gatekeeping 
function was historically an ethical norm to which the tax bar largely 
adhered (at least in practice, even if not specifically acknowledged), 
practitioners have increasingly rejected that norm over recent decades.  
It may be tempting for some to ascribe the tax shelter activity in modern 
times to the work of individual bad apples, or to bemoan the lack of 
individual moral character among modern day attorneys.119  But this 
explanation misses the fact that it is not the intrinsic nature of the 
individuals involved that has changed.  Individuals will always act in 
their own self-interest unless constrained by legal or societal 
constraints.120  Despite the immutability of humankind, ethical norms 
do not remain static.  What is currently ethically acceptable is primarily 
a function of society’s prevailing moral framework, as adapted to the 
context of the particular subgroup to which the ethical norm is 
applicable.121  So the question is not why individual practitioners today 
are “less” ethical than their predecessors, but rather, why does the tax 
bar no longer view a gatekeeping function as the appropriate ethical 
norm? 
While numerous factors and changes over the recent decades have 
 
119. See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX 
REV. 1, 19 (2011); Morse, supra note 14, at 988; Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement: Tax 
Shelters, The Cash Economy, and Compliance Costs, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005).  
However, the widespread nature of the tax shelter market in the 1990s and early 2000s belie the 
plausibility of merely ascribing the activity to “bad apple” taxpayers and tax practitioners.  
Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 186.   
120. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge University 
Press 1991) (1651); Evelyn Keyes, The Just Society and the Liberal State: Classical and 
Contemporary Liberalism and the Problem of Consent, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 45 (2011) 
(“All laws are official societal constraints upon individual liberty and equality enforceable by the 
State.  Laws officially determine who is equal to whom with respect to a given liberty or 
constraint and who is in a different position.  They determine the boundaries, or scope, of the 
liberties we may exercise against each other and the penalties for their infringement.  The 
enactment of legislation is thus integral to the generation and maintenance of the just society.”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary.”).  
121. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 126.  See also Keyes, supra note 
120, at 60 (“[T]he entire moral purpose of legislation, including both negative constraints and 
positive rights, is to enact and maintain through a moral and rational process those laws the 
people themselves deem both fair to each and conducive to the safety and happiness of all.  When 
unfairness is perceived in the societal constraints upon negative or positive liberty or in the 
distribution of social goods, or when the need appears for legislation more conducive to fairness 
or prosperity, legislators are responsible for making equitable corrections to the law.”). 
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undoubtedly contributed to the shift in the ethical reality of tax practice, 
four overarching areas of change can be easily identified as highly 
significant in altering the ethical perceptions of the tax bar: (1) evolving 
client norms for ethical behavior; (2) increasing competitive pressures 
on legal service providers; (3) changing judicial approaches to statutory 
interpretation; and (4) a lessening imperative favoring taxpaying in 
society as a whole. 
1. Client Norms for Ethical Behavior 
One of the key factors supporting the existence of a gatekeeping 
norm was the belief that by steering a client away from overly 
aggressive transactions, the tax lawyer was in fact acting in the client’s 
best interest.  Implicit in this position was the assumption that the client 
agreed that (1) a taxpayer has a duty to forthrightly pay its allocable 
portion of the nation’s tax liability, and (2) the economic and public 
relations costs associated with defending questionable tax transactions 
outweighed the benefits from engaging in such transactions.  Although 
this was the accepted perception in the 1950s, matters have changed 
drastically since then.  While in the past business ethics were 
substantially coextensive with the prevailing morality of society, today 
there exists a schism where a businesswoman will think nothing of 
undertaking an action on behalf of her business that would not be 
condoned as a matter of personal behavior.122  The creation of a 
separate business ethical culture has been driven by the idea that the 
proper focus of a corporation is the creation of profits for its owners.123  
As a result, while businesses may highlight their socially responsible 
actions as a public relations and marketing matter, shareholder profits 
remain king.124  In such an environment, moral and ethical 
 
122. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 168–69. 
123. See David Campbell et al., Social Welfare, Positivism, and Business Ethics, 11 BUS. 
ETHICS: A EUR. REV. 263, 268, 273 (2002) (discussing the ongoing conflict between business 
ethics and the drive for profits).  See also Gordon Pearson, Making Profits and Sweet Music, 9 
BUS. ETHICS: A EUR. REV. 191, 191 (2000) (noting that business ethics is a distraction that can 
lure a company away from its focus). 
124. John Philip Jones, Global Business: Oversight without Inhibiting Enterprise, 603 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 262, 264 (2006) (“[Corporate social responsibility 
(“CSR”)] has little real influence on the operating policy of major companies.  From a large 
sample of such companies, it was found for instance that their donations to charity account for 
less than 1 percent of their pretax profits.  To such companies, CSR may have benefits from the 
public relations standpoint, but that is about all.”).  Proponents of CSR often take the position that 
companies should place doing good for society above the bottom line.  See, e.g., M. Todd 
Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 571, 581 (2009).  However, many argue that, in practice, CSR efforts are merely co-opted 
by businesses for public relations and marketing purposes.  Michael B. Runnels, Elizabeth J. 
Kennedy, & Rev. Timothy B. Brown, S.J., Corporate Social Responsibility and the New 
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considerations are perceived as at most window dressing and therefore 
they have no power to curb behavior harmful to society.  As a result, the 
key constraints on any economically justified business behavior are 
almost exclusively those actually imposed by law.125  But how are these 
legal constraints best applied?  From a purely competitive vantage 
point, the goal of business is to minimize the impact of any legal 
constraints that do exist.  Hence, the direction from clients to their 
lawyers is clear: interpret the law as narrowly as possible and without 
reference to moral or ethical considerations.  The focus on the bottom 
line within the business world contributes to the perception that legal 
advisors serve merely as “hired guns” to further the goals of the 
client.126  The function of lawyers, while more than mere scriveners, 
became merely implementing exogenously determined business goals 
rather than being active participants in helping to shape, channel, 
modify, or (heaven forbid) question those announced goals.  In the face 
of such clear client-driven directives to achieve legal conclusions 
consonant with the business bottom line, it became very difficult, if not 
impossible, for an attorney to justify a gatekeeping role as being in line 
with his client’s perceived best interests. 
2. Legal Services Norms 
As the prevailing business culture began to devalue the lawyer’s role 
as a counselor, lawyers themselves began to devalue that role.127  This 
trend found a traditional antecedent in the historical place of zealous 
advocacy in litigation.  Further, just as clients were succumbing to 
competitive pressures to focus solely on their bottom line profit, 
competitive pressures were building in the legal marketplace.  Where 
lawyers practicing in law firm settings had traditionally provided legal 
services, there was a move by businesses to pull more legal talent in-
house.128  This development not only gave these in-house lawyers a 
 
Governance: In Search Of Epstein’s Good Company in the Employment Context, 43 AKRON L. 
REV. 501, 532 (2010); Edwin M. Epstein, The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 207, 212 (2007).   
125. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 169. 
126. Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation and 
Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 381, 381 (2001).  See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 247 
(Oxford 1989) (“[L]awyers are hired guns: they know they are, their clients demand that they be, 
and the public sees them that way.”); MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 72 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the history of client-centered representation); 
Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (2005) (same).   
127. Pearce, supra note 126, at 381. 
128. See also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
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more myopic view of their role in serving the client, but also provided 
businesses with their own sophisticated legal capabilities.  This 
movement towards in-house law practice both decreased the revenue 
flowing to law firms by taking away many run-of-the-mill legal 
questions129 and provided clients with the ability to question legal 
advice and take a more active role in shaping the guidance ultimately 
provided by their outside counsel.130 
Finally, lawyers began facing competition from accounting firms and 
consulting groups that added lawyers as employees and partners to 
provide expanded advice to their clients.131  While these newly hired 
lawyers could not draft operative documents for clients without running 
into issues regarding the unauthorized practice of law by their non-
licensed employers,132 they could provide sophisticated tax planning 
advice tailored to their client’s desires.133  The expansion of accounting 
 
GOVERNANCE 195 (2006); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the 
Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2071–72, 2113–14 (2010) 
(discussing the different roles and skill sets of in-house and outside counsel). 
129. COFFEE, supra note 128, at 224.  See also Robert J. Rhee, On Legal Education and 
Reform: One View Formed from Diverse Perspectives, 70 MD. L. REV. 310, 324 (2011) (“The 
rise of in-house counsel has led to greater price transparency and opportunities to rationalize legal 
services, resulting in greater economic pressure on external attorneys.”). 
130. Wilkins, supra note 128, at 2071 (“Due in large measure to the growth of in-house legal 
departments, corporate clients today have a far greater ability to hold their lawyer-agents to full-
throated standards of partisan advocacy . . . .”). 
131. Matthew A. Melone, The Patenting of Tax Strategies: A Patently Unnecessary 
Development, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 437, 478–79 (2007); Rostain, supra note 11, at 88–
92. 
132. Since the time of the Great Depression, state bar associations have actively sought to 
prevent non-lawyers, especially accountants, from engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.  
Kathryn Lolita Yarbrough, Multidisciplinary Practices: Are They Already among Us?, 53 ALA. 
L. REV. 639, 641 (2002).  These efforts led to the adoption of ethical rules effectively prohibiting 
lawyers from engaging in multi-disciplinary practices (MDPs) (essentially a firm in which 
lawyers and nonlawyers share their fees).  Id.  This approach continues today in the model rules, 
which provide that a “lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities 
of the partnership consist of the practice of law.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) 
(2011).  Notwithstanding this limitation, accounting firms began claiming that their attorney 
partners and employees were not practicing law based on traditional (and federally sanctioned) 
exceptions allowing accountants to represent clients in federal tax matters.  John S. Dzienkowski 
& Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market 
Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 83, 110–12 (2000); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the “No” Rule Become a 
New Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 881–82 (1999).  The one function such firms typically 
eschewed was the actual drafting of contracts and other operative documents, since that activity 
carried a higher risk of being seen as the actual practice of law.  Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra, at 
111–12. 
133. The effective ability of accounting firms to engage in MDPs in the tax realm led the 
ABA to reconsider its historic prohibition on MDPs in the late 1990s.  However, the ABA’s 
House of Delegates rejected the proposed relaxation of the MDP prohibition.  See generally Paul 
D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP 
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and consulting firms into the tax law market was further exacerbated by 
the international operations of many businesses and the integration of 
legal and accounting functions in many international jurisdictions.134  
Thus, tax lawyers were faced not just with competition from other law 
firms, but also with competition from in-house legal functions and non-
legal service providers.  In turn, such competition, coupled with clients 
who were both less loyal to their historical outside legal counsel135 and 
more willing to take their business to the provider who would sanction 
their preferred interpretation of the law, inevitably led to a race to the 
bottom in legal services,136 where transactions were judged using the 
lowest common denominator of technical compliance with the literal 
terms of the law.137 
3. Judicial Norms of Statutory Interpretation 
A related factor in attorney perceptions regarding the appropriateness 
of a tax gatekeeping role derived from the judiciary’s attitude toward 
tax avoidance and statutory interpretation.138  This factor is particularly 
significant because it directly contributes to the dynamic encouraging 
the previously discussed factors.  Historically, the judiciary took a non-
literal approach to interpreting tax statutes and developed numerous 
judicial anti-abuse doctrines aimed at curbing overly aggressive 
taxpayer positions.139  Even as courts formally endorsed the position 
that structuring transactions to minimize taxation was permissible, they 
 
Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193 (2010) (providing a history of the MDP debate).  
The prospect for relaxation of the MDP prohibition was recently raised in the context of the 
ABA’s Ethics 20/20 initiative, but the Ethics 20/20 committee has recently announced that it will 
not propose any change to the nonlawyer ownership prohibition.  Press Release, ABA Comm’n 
on Ethics 20/20, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Will Not Propose Changes to ABA Policy 
Prohibiting Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms (Apr. 16, 2012), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120416_news_release_re_non 
lawyer_ownership_law_firms.authcheckdam.pdf.   
134. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 132, at 113–17; Gianluca Morello, Note, Big Six 
Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for Law Firms: Why Multidiscipline Practices Should Be 
Permitted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 190, 190–94 (1997). 
135. See COFFEE, supra note 128, at 194–96 (discussing the change in the economic 
relationship between corporate lawyer and client and how this led to a decrease in loyalty by 
corporate clients to their outside counsel). 
136. Simon, supra note 9, at 1072–73 (noting that ideology and self-interest could equally 
lead business lawyers to either a “gladiator” or “gatekeeper” model, and that under the “gladiator” 
approach, “we would expect lawyers . . . to compete for clients in terms of their relative 
willingness to assist in the evasion or frustration of costly regulation through aggressive planning 
and litigation . . . and to embrace, or at least tolerate, a race to the bottom”). 
137. Beale, supra note 35, at 597; Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers, supra note 11, at 55–
59. 
138. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 183. 
139. Id. at 177–78 (and cases cited therein). 
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typically rejected the particular tax-motivated transaction in the case 
before them.140  Thus, while the law created a line between acceptable 
and unacceptable behavior, the edges of that line were often ill-defined. 
In creating a level of uncertainty regarding the exact boundaries of 
the law, courts fashioned an atmosphere conducive to an efficient and 
fair self-assessment system.  When taxpayers and practitioners knew 
that courts could be expected to reject legal positions based on 
unintended literal interpretations of the law or to reach results at odds 
with the tax policy underlying the law, they were encouraged to be more 
circumspect and evenhanded in their initial tax positions.  Taxpayers 
were less inclined to view the law as merely a system of specific rules 
to be gamed by clever artifice since such attempts could be expected to 
fail.  Similarly, practitioners were on stronger footing in dissuading a 
taxpayer from undertaking a tax-motivated transaction since the 
likelihood of the transaction withstanding judicial scrutiny was greatly 
reduced.  Thus, a strong judicial norm of dynamic interpretation of tax 
statutes promoted a gatekeeping function by effectively aligning the 
interests of both clients and practitioners.  Expanding the area of 
uncertainty regarding the exact reach of the tax law restored some of the 
legal constraints on overly aggressive planning and created room for 
attorneys to assert ethical considerations as relevant when navigating 
the zone of legal uncertainty, thereby allowing both ethical and legal 
considerations to act as constraints on aggressive taxpayer actions.141 
 
140. For illustration, the following, seemingly pro-taxpayer quotations all come from cases 
where the taxpayer nevertheless lost.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935) 
(“The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or 
altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.”).  Superior Oil Co. 
v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395–96 (1930) (“The only purpose of the vendor here was to escape 
taxation . . . .  The fact that it desired to evade the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the 
very meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you 
do not pass it.”); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630–31 (1916) (“When the law draws a line, 
a case is on one side of it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party 
has availed himself to the full of what the law permits.  When an act is condemned as an evasion 
what is meant is that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy if not by the mere 
letter of the law.”); Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., 
dissenting) (“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging 
one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible.  Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do 
right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced 
exactions, not voluntary contributions.  To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.”); 
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) (“[A] transaction, otherwise within an 
exception of the tax law, does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, 
or, if one choose [sic], to evade, taxation.  Any one [sic] may so arrange his affairs that his taxes 
shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the 
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.”), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465, 469 
(1935) .   
141. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 179. 
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As the judiciary moved away from this traditional approach to tax 
cases, it created uncertainty regarding how the law should be viewed 
and forced practitioners to directly face the conflict between 
representing their clients zealously and their role in maintaining a fair 
and efficient functioning of the self-assessment system.142  Corporate 
taxpayers who saw the judiciary upholding the aggressive tax 
transactions of their competitors felt compelled to engage in such 
activity themselves.143  This was both a competitive necessity and a 
breaking down of the moral norm of paying one’s fair share of the 
country’s tax burden.  By giving full voice to JP Morgan’s view that 
taxation was a purely legal matter devoid of moral concerns,144 rather 
than mere lip service, the judiciary bolstered the emerging business 
focus on profits and cost-benefit analysis as the only legitimate 
constraints on behavior.  In turn, business clients generally had no 
patience for attorneys who attempted to dissuade desired transactions 
based solely on ethical or anti-abuse notions.  Lawyers not acceding to 
this new reality found themselves at a distinct disadvantage. 
Further, even lawyers who traditionally would have advised against 
aggressive transactions based on non-literal legal interpretations and 
anti-abuse notions had to question the validity of their own legal 
reasoning.  At its core, the job of a lawyer is to predict the future for his 
clients.  As courts muddied the water regarding how they would 
approach the application of tax statutes, the attorney’s job became much 
more difficult.  Even if a particular attorney believed a tax-motivated 
transaction was too good to be true, one that she would not uphold if she 
were a judge, she would know that a judge with a more literalist 
disposition might well condone the transaction.145  How could the 
attorney in good conscience advise a client against a transaction when 
an identified segment of the judiciary would likely find the transaction 
perfectly legal?  Given the lawyer’s clear ethical duty to assist her  
client and the undeniable competitive pressure facing her, it is little 
wonder that even practitioners predisposed to undertaking a gatekeeping 
function chose to abandon that older ethical norm as a viable standard 
for ongoing behavior. 
4. Decreased Societal Impetus toward Taxpaying 
Finally, broader changes in American society influenced the tax bar’s 
view of its gatekeeping role.  Historically, there was a moral component 
 
142. Id. at 190–91. 
143. Id. at 181–82. 
144. See supra note 75. 
145. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 182–83. 
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to taxpaying in the United States.146  While this began to give way in 
the 1930s,147 World War II saw a renewed patriotic impetus toward 
taxpaying.148  Even after the War, the United States found itself locked 
in an ideological struggle with Communism that supported a taxpaying 
impetus on the public.149  However, as society moved beyond these 
periods of crisis,150 the viewpoint that taxation was purely a forced 
extraction of wealth from citizens without any moral or ethical 
component began to reassert itself.151 
Since the mid-1960s, the country has seen a general decline in the 
level of respect for, and trust in, government and other institutions.152  
The portion of Americans who responded that the federal government 
can be trusted “to do what is right” most of the time or just about always 
fell from 76% in 1964 to 30% in 2008.153  This general decline in trust 
had a direct impact on tax compliance.154  As society moved further 
 
146. See, e.g., JOHN S. WISE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 74 (1905) (depicting 
tax evasion as unpatriotic and faithless). 
147. See Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of 
Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 953, 997–1000 (2004) (discussing the 
changing judicial, legal, economic, and political views on taxation and tax avoidance that began 
to emerge in the 1920s, and the shift from moral to “amoral discourse on tax avoidance”). 
148. See Jones, supra note 78, at 716 (discussing income tax propaganda in American films 
during World War II). 
149. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 11–13. 
150. John R. Alford, We’re All in This Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958–
1996, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28, 45–49 (John R. 
Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) (suggesting that in the United States a low level of 
trust in the government is the norm, and that external threats to the country cause that trust to 
increase temporarily). 
151. Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic Virtues of a Tax 
Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 65–69, 78–79 (2007) (noting the decline in media 
perceptions of taxpaying obligations from strong portrayals of honest taxpayers in the 1950s and 
1960s, to mixed messages in the early 1970s, to apparent endorsements of tax cheating in the 
1990s; and linking this decline in part to societal changes during that period that have weakened 
public trust in government to tax and spend wisely). 
152. SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS, 
LABOR AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND 15 (Johns Hopkins University Press rev. ed. 
1987) (1983) (“[T]he early 1960s turned out to be a high-water mark in the history of the 
American public’s attitudes toward their key social, political and economic structures.”); Anthony 
King, Distrust of Government: Explaining American Exceptionalism, in DISAFFECTED 
DEMOCRACIES 74, 95–97 (Susan J. Pharr & Robert D. Putnam eds., 2000) (noting as causes of 
increased distrust of government, among other things, the public reaction to the Vietnam War and 
Watergate, the resurgence of federalism, and the increased polarization and declining civility of 
political discourse). 
153. THE AM. NAT’L ELECTION STUDIES, THE ANES GUIDE TO PUBLIC OPINION AND 
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR tbl.5A.1 (2010), available at http://electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/ 
tab5a_1.htm. 
154. See Kornhauser, supra note 25, at 873–75 (noting that distrust of government has 
increased markedly since the mid-1960s and highlighting the linkage between such decreased 
trust and decreased taxpayer compliance with the law); Lavoie, Taxpaying Ethos, supra note 18, 
6_LAVOIE 3/9/2013  1:36 PM 
2013] Am I My Brother’s Keeper? 849 
away from the ideal that taxpaying was a moral and patriotic duty, the 
role of tax attorneys in advising their clients shifted as well.  Indeed, 
these same societal forces can be seen behind the general decline in 
respect for attorneys since the mid-1960s.155 
III. THE FUTURE OF TAX GATEKEEPING 
The foregoing discussion reviewed the historical arguments for and 
against a gatekeeping norm in the tax arena and demonstrated that a 
gatekeeping norm existed in the past, but has been largely abandoned 
today.  This Part addresses the question: Should we care?  And if we do 
care, what can be done to reinvigorate and reestablish a gatekeeping 
norm within the tax bar? 
A. Whither (or Wither) Tax Gatekeeping? 
This Article takes the position that we should care and that it is 
worthwhile to resurrect a gatekeeping function for the tax bar.  The 
main rationale in support of this view is that an attorney’s role as a 
zealous advocate should and must be circumscribed to ensure that the 
self-assessment system functions properly and that taxpayers continue 
to perceive the tax system as fair.  A breakdown in respect for the tax 
system could well lead to widespread tax avoidance and a collapse of 
the stable taxpaying ethos in the United States.156  A strong gatekeeping 
norm within the tax bar can help forestall this possibility and promote 
the rule of law. 
The historical argument that an ethical gatekeeping norm was 
unnecessary because it was sufficiently covered by an attorney’s general 
ethical obligations157 has clearly been refuted by the waves of tax 
shelter activity in recent decades.  At the same time, the very existence 
of this tax shelter activity can be utilized to argue against continuing to 
assert a gatekeeping norm.158  This argument uses the failure of the 
 
at 650–55. 
155. Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, 
and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 811–16 (1998) (noting 1960 as a possible high 
point for public respect for lawyers, which was followed by a marked descent in media portrayals 
of attorneys from “unalloyed” heroes to “flawed” and “morally ambiguous” figures). 
156. See generally Lavoie, Taxpaying Ethos, supra note 18, at 660–71 (arguing that trust in 
Government and other taxpayers supports tax compliance). 
157. Hatfield, supra note 8, at 22–24, 31–32.  
158. Watson, Duty Reconsidered, supra note 55, at 1198, 1236–37 (arguing against the 
traditional “duty to the system” standard and for legislatively creating a normative standard to 
which tax practitioners must adhere “because it is now painfully clear that relying on an 
ideological “‘duty to the system’ has not worked”).  A gatekeeping ideal “should be a normative 
one in which clear expectations are firmly established, and the ability of all tax practitioners to 
comply is feasible in practice.  But this has not been the case, and that has led to our present 
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historical gatekeeping norm to prevent past tax shelter waves as 
evidence that the traditionally articulated gatekeeping obligation was 
too ill-defined to serve as an enforceable normative guide for actual 
practitioner actions.159  Therefore, according to this argument, 
advocating for a gatekeeping function is a misguided effort that will 
never stand up to the competitive pressures practitioners face and thus 
can never serve as a realistic constrain on aggressive taxpayer behavior. 
It is undoubtedly true that practitioners abysmally failed as 
gatekeepers during periods of tax shelter activity in the past forty years.  
However, this observed failure is most likely due to the rejection of 
gatekeeping as a legitimate ethical norm by a majority of practitioners, 
despite the legal academy routinely asserting during this period that a 
gatekeeping role existed for tax lawyers.160  As discussed earlier, ethical 
behavior is ultimately determined by the specific culture (or sub-
culture) creating the norm.161  Merely stating that any particular norm 
should exist in a society is nonsense, and attempting to impose a norm 
from the outside, without the means and will to enforce it, is an exercise 
in futility.162  To be effective, an ethical norm must reflect the 
consensus of those to whom it applies and be subject to effective 
internal enforcement.163  While gatekeeping within the tax bar has often 
been proclaimed as the accepted ethical norm, at least since the 1965 
Opinion, that has never been the ABA’s formal opinion. 
Thus, it is disingenuous to suggest that the tax bar should not attempt 
to reach a consensus in favor of a gatekeeping role merely because a 
true consensus with formal adoption by the bar has not existed in recent 
times.  The goal of this Article is to propose a means by which the tax 
bar may be encouraged to shoulder this burden on its own initiative in a 
manner that will give both form and reality to an ethical gatekeeping 
norm. 
An alternative response may be that Government actions have 
already interceded to such a degree that recognizing an ethical norm of 
gatekeeping is irrelevant and unnecessary today.  Following the 
Government’s recent changes to Circular 230,164 the civil penalty 
 
problems.”  Id. at 1198. 
159. Id. at 1220–22. 
160. See supra notes 9 and 11 and accompanying text (discussing commentators’ belief that 
tax attorneys have an obligation to promote a fair system and the rejection of this obligation by 
tax attorneys in recent decades). 
161. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (noting that the prevailing moral framework 
in society determines what is ethically acceptable). 
162. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 136–38. 
163. Id. at 138. 
164. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text (discussing the current Circular 230 and 
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provisions,165 the codification of the economic substance doctrine,166 
and its efforts to increase taxpayer disclosure of questionable 
transactions,167 there is little discretion left to tax advisors to promote 
abusive transactions or assist their clients in pursuing such schemes.168  
In effect, the failure of the bar to come to a consensus and enforce an 
ethical gatekeeping norm has led the Government to impose the 
functional equivalent as a matter of law—as evidenced by the recent 
downturn in tax shelter activity.169 
Of course, if this position is correct, then the bar should have no 
problem formally adopting and embracing an ethical gatekeeping norm 
that merely confirms the existing legally imposed reality.  
Unfortunately, we see no impetus to conform the ABA’s formally 
announced standards to this supposed new reality.170  Further, the 
nature of a legally imposed rule is that it applies only in the specific 
circumstances covered, and we have seen how adept the tax bar can be 
in finding loopholes in structures of legally imposed rules.171  If there is 
no ethical standard to backstop the Government’s imposed rules, then 
there is no incentive to prevent attorneys from exploiting any areas not 
specifically governed by the legally imposed rules.  In these gap areas, 
tax attorneys would be free to pursue the same destructive tax shelter 
activity that has occurred in recent decades. 
 
the ethical obligations it imposes on written tax advice given by tax attorneys). 
165. See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text (discussing changes to civil penalty 
provisions that make it more difficult for taxpayers to avoid penalties associated with tax-
avoidance transactions). 
166. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (summarizing this judicial doctrine that was 
codified to combat the most recent wave of tax shelter activity). 
167. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing Form 1120 Schedule UTP that 
requires certain corporations to disclose uncertain tax positions). 
168. See, e.g., Watson, Duty Reconsidered, supra note 55, at 1237 (noting that legislation 
would allow fewer opportunities for tax attorneys to promote aggressive positions). 
169. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (suggesting that the 2008 economic downturn 
also played a role in slowing tax shelter activity). 
170. Neither the ABA generally nor its Section of Taxation, Standards of Tax Practice 
Committee have scheduled projects to reconsider the continued viability of the 1985 Opinion, the 
1965 Opinion, or tax attorney ethical standards generally in light of the recent legislative and 
Circular 230 changes.  See Michael Hatfield, The Tax Section’s Ethics Debate—Historical 
Reflections, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 7, 2011, LEXIS 2011 TNT 173-9 (noting a debate held at 
the May 2011 ABA Section of Taxation meeting over whether Circular 230 should incorporate 
the reporting standards set forth in the section 6694 return preparer penalty standards—as the 
Government subsequently did—or retain the “realistic possibility” standard that the ABA had 
adopted in the 1985 Opinion—as the Tax Section was advocating—and summing up the debate 
by noting that attendees remained closely divided on the issue and concluding that “there 
continues to be ambivalence in the tax bar about the transformation of professional ethics into 
professional regulation”).   
171. See supra note 15 (quoting various legal professionals describing the tax bar’s ability to 
develop tax shelters). 
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While it may turn out that the current set of rules provides an all-
inclusive barrier to attorney participation in tax shelter activity, there is 
reason to be skeptical of this conclusion.  After the amendments to 
Circular 230 in the 1980s and the adoption of statutory rules to curtail 
tax shelter transactions, tax shelter activity dropped for a few years 
before new tax shelter schemes arose in the 1990s.172  While the 
Government’s actions spelled the demise of certain types of tax shelters, 
the drop off in activity may have merely resulted from the retooling of 
the industry.  Conversely, the decline in present day tax shelter activity 
may be due more to the fact that taxpayers have less income and gain to 
shelter as a result of the worst economic downturn in the United States 
since the Great Depression.173  When the economy turns around in the 
coming years, it is likely that we will once again see more pressure for 
tax shelter transactions.  Whether the Government’s current rules will 
effectively contain that pressure remains to be seen. 
As a final point in favor of attempting to refine and reassert a tax 
gatekeeping norm, it should be noted that reaching consensus on such a 
norm is in the best long-term interest of both the bar and clients.  The 
changes to Circular 230 and the penalty provisions in response to the 
tax shelter wave in the 1990s have placed significant additional burdens 
on practitioners and their clients.174  These rules have clearly put real 
constraints on the relationship between clients and their attorneys and 
arguably dissuade the provision of some legitimate tax advice and 
planning.175  Should lawyer-assisted tax shelter activity become 
rampant again, the bar should expect the Government to impose even 
more draconian restrictions on it.  Taking concrete steps today to 
prevent future abuses and thereby forestall any further potentially 
overbroad and restrictive government intrusions into the attorney-client 
relationship should be supported as in the best interest of all involved. 
B. Creating an Accepted and Sustainable Gatekeeping Norm 
If a gatekeeping norm is desirable in the tax area, but appears to no 
longer exist, what can be done to create one anew?  Most commentators 
in the last few decades have maintained that tax practitioners do in fact 
 
172. The tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s fell out of use following the adoption of the 
passive activity loss restrictions in 1986.  See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
173. Kaye, supra note 14, at 604.  For a detailed discussion of the economic downturn, see 
JERRY M. ROSENBERG, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE GREAT RECESSION 2007-2010 
(2010).  
174. See generally Weisbach & Gale, supra note 94, at 1279–80 (discussing the changes to 
the regulatory structure in response to the proliferation of tax shelters in the 1990s). 
175. Charles A. Rose, Note, The Tax Lawyer’s Dilemma: Recent Developments Heighten Tax 
Lawyer Responsibilities and Liabilities, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 258, 260–62. 
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have an ethical gatekeeping obligation.176  This Article has 
demonstrated that while, as a tax policy matter, such an ethical 
obligation should exist—and did exist at least for a time—the modern 
reality of tax shelter activity belies its continued survival.  The problem 
is that ethical rules, and for that matter even rules of law, are worthless 
if they are not truly accepted and internalized by the group governed by 
such rules.  Thus, if a gatekeeping norm is desirable, merely 
proclaiming its existence will by itself do little to bring that norm into 
actual existence.  This is especially true when powerful forces, both 
internal and external to the group, push members of the group toward 
retaining the existing norm.177  Reestablishing a gatekeeping norm 
within the tax bar requires changing the existing culture of the tax bar, 
which in turn requires altering or exploiting various elements of the 
broader societal milieu in which the tax bar operates. 
1. Reaching Consensus and Announcing a Standard 
The imposition of an ethical rule on a group does not guarantee that 
the rule will be followed.  To achieve a practical reality, the rule must 
be generally accepted as correct by those subject to it,178 and be subject 
to effective enforcement mechanisms to dissuade non-compliant 
behavior.179  Essentially, there must be a consensus regarding the rule 
for it to have legitimacy.  Consequently, internally debated and 
 
176. See supra notes 9 and 11 (listing various recent legal articles that advocate for a 
gatekeeping function within the tax bar). 
177. See Maggi Carfield, Participatory Law and Development: Remapping the Locus of 
Authority, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 739, 770 (2011) (“It is undeniable that cultures are dynamic and 
change over time.  But . . . [u]nless there is some internally driven desire to change, reformers 
will likely encounter a great deal of resistance.  Change is likely to be a more organic and 
incremental process.”); Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to 
Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1321 (1998) (“[P]rofessional norms that comprise 
the zealous advocate ideal may work against attempts to deter lawyers from conduct that harms 
the legal framework.  Put simply, a lawyer may value her reputation as a ‘scorched-earth, take-
no-prisoners’ litigator and be willing to risk even severe legal sanctions to maintain it.  In 
conceding a role for social norms, regulatory legal ethics ultimately forsakes its original project of 
developing an account of a regulatory regime to cover an abstract ‘bad’ lawyer—a lawyer 
stripped down to a maximizer of short-term financial self-interest.  In its place, a regulatory 
approach must embark on a more ambitious program.  At the very least, it needs a thicker 
empirical account of social norms and their interactions with legal norms and market forces.”). 
178. Rostain, supra note 177, at 1340 (“For [ethical] regulation to be effective, it needs to be 
undergirded by widespread commitments among lawyers to the values reflected in the regulatory 
enterprise.  A central concern of legal ethics scholarship must be to investigate, articulate, and 
shore-up such collective commitments in the context of law practice.”); Eugene R. Gaetke, 
Expecting Too Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. PITT L. REV. 693, 729–30 (2006) (“What 
the . . . study suggests . . . is that lawyers will be more likely to obey new rules regarding 
professional behavior if the rules reflect values that are moral in their content and are legitimate 
in the sense that they are supported by a consensus within the bar.”). 
179. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 117. 
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democratically adopted norms are likely to be obeyed, even by those 
who did not originally favor the adopted norm.180  Of course, 
establishing consensus around an ethical standard is immeasurably 
harder when there is a preexisting standard to the contrary. 
This is unfortunately the predicament facing a renewed tax 
gatekeeping norm.  While the extant literature maintains that 
practitioners have such an ethical obligation, and the Government 
informally concurs, the ABA’s pronouncements in the 1965 Opinion 
and the 1985 Opinion are premised on treating tax practice as an 
adversarial endeavor.181  Despite the proliferation of tax shelter activity 
in the 1990s and the significant changes to Circular 230 and the civil 
penalty provisions, the ABA has not revisited the 1985 Opinion.  
Further, the broader legal profession has long embraced an all-
encompassing zealous advocacy norm that is only slowly changing. 
The first step in reviving a tax gatekeeping norm is to withdraw the 
1985 Opinion and replace it with one explicitly endorsing a gatekeeping 
role in tax planning.  On its face this presents a “which came first” 
problem, since announcing the new ethical norm would help promote 
consensus around it, but consensus regarding the norm is presumably an 
essential element in adopting the new norm in the first place.  However, 
consensus is often formed through open discussion.  Even though the 
required consensus may be presently lacking, if the ABA were to 
undertake a new study on the provision of tax advice to clients, a new 
consensus could well emerge.  Indeed, there are a number of changes in 
recent years that could be brought to bear in favor of adopting a 
gatekeeping norm, including (1) the growing academic acceptance that 
restraining the zealous advocacy norm outside of (and sometimes even 
 
180. See, e.g., James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, Collective 
Decision Institutions and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 301–02 (1993) 
(finding higher compliance when a matter is voted on and when the outcome has wide support).  
Accord T.R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19–57, 161–78 (1990) (arguing that people 
generally comply with the law if they perceive the process that leads to this law as fair).  See also 
James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Changing the Social Norm of Tax 
Compliance by Voting, 52 KYKLOS 141, 163 (1999) (concluding that individual compliance 
behavior can be effected by the outcome of a vote on the strength of an enforcement regime for a 
fiscal system); Bruneo Feld & J.R. Tyran, Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis, 55 
KYKLOS 197, 218 (2002) (finding that tax compliance is higher on average when subjects are 
allowed to approve or reject the proposal because such a vote indicates legitimacy); Benno 
Torgler & Christoph A. Schaltegger, Tax Amnesties and Political Participation, 33 PUB. FIN. 
REV. 403, 426 (2005) (finding strong evidence that individuals are more compliant when they 
have the opportunity to vote and communication among group members occurs prior to the vote); 
Benno Torgler, What Do We Know about Tax Morale and Tax Compliance?, 48 INT’L REV. 
ECON. & BUS. 395, 395–412 (2001) (surveying literature on political participation and 
compliance). 
181. See text accompanying supra notes 70–78 and 93–96. 
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inside of) litigation is legitimate;182 (2) the reality of recent direct 
regulation of tax practice by the Government;183 and (3) the risk of even 
more draconian Government regulation in the future if the bar’s failure 
to effectively self-regulate results in yet another wave of lawyer-assisted 
tax shelter activity. 
Still, while beginning a real discussion of the proper role of advisors 
within the tax bar is a crucial first step if an effective gatekeeping norm 
is to be established, there is no guarantee that such discussions would 
result in that consensus.  Despite the fact that restraining its own 
behavior is in the best interest of the tax bar (and its clients) because it 
would avoid more Government regulation, powerful forces push the tax 
bar in the other direction.  These include, among others: (1) competitive 
pressures that force attorneys to compete for clients based on tax results 
rather than sound advice; (2) outside pressure from clients who engage 
in a collaborative approach to obtaining legal advice; and (3) increased 
uncertainty regarding the judicial demeanor toward tax planning and 
statutory interpretation.  If these forces are to be overcome, some 
countervailing forces must be put in play to nudge the tax bar toward a 
gatekeeping consensus. 
2. Seizing the Power of Individual Actions 
Changing a cultural norm is not an easy task.  Generally, such norms 
remain stable and resistant to change.  When change occurs, however, it 
typically does so quickly rather gradually.184  This tipping-point nature 
 
182. See generally, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); 
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
(2000); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); William H. 
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. 
REV. 29.  See also Wendel, supra note 3, at 1181–82 (describing the concept of zealous advocacy 
norm as a “shopworm aphorism”); Wilkins, supra note 128, at 2067–73 (arguing that necessity of 
ethical and regulatory changes that promote the role of attorneys as gatekeepers within modern 
day corporate-attorney relationships); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating 
Lawyers after Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1147–51 (1993). 
183. See supra notes 105–13 and accompanying text (discussing various recent instances 
where the Government has directly intervened with the method in which the tax bar practices, and 
where the Government has imposed various restrictions and penalties associated with 
questionable tax transactions and advice). 
184. Social groups tend to be resistant to social norm change because the internal cohesion of 
the group is based in part on a shared belief that is then internally enforced among group 
members.  However, as greater numbers begin to break free of these internal enforcement 
mechanisms and flout the norm, it causes others to question whether the norm to which they are 
adhering is truly shared by the group.  ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
160–61 (1984).  Once this happens, members of the group tend to change their belief to the new 
norm to remain attached to their group, with a resulting cascade effect towards the adoption of the 
new norm.  See Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to 
the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (1997).  See also Natalie S. Glance & 
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of cultural norms highlights an unexpected vehicle for prompting rapid 
change, individual action.185  On its face, it may seem absurd to assert 
that the actions of an individual, or a small cadre of individuals, could 
lead to a cultural change; but even small changes to a social norm can 
precipitate dramatic and rapid changes given the right conditions.186  
This insight builds on modern theories of disease transmission that 
model how viruses spread at an exponential rate through a susceptible 
population once the number of infected individuals reaches a critical 
mass.187 Essentially, human behaviors can themselves be contagious.188  
In this way, if even a small group of people reject an existing norm, 
others seeing their action may decide that they themselves should adopt 
it and start an informational or reputational cascade effect.189  Such 
 
Bernardo A. Huberman, The Dynamics of Social Dilemmas, SCI. AM., Mar. 1994, at 76, 78–79 
(using borrowed methods from statistical thermodynamics to study the evolution of social 
cooperation, and finding that in such a model there are generally two highly stable minima 
representing widespread cooperation and widespread defection, separated by a highly unstable 
barrier from which the system slides away to one of the two minima very quickly if ever such a 
maximum is reached); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 343 (1984) (explaining how question framing demonstrates preferences 
that violate the dominance requirement of rational choice); Richard H. McAdams, Relative 
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (arguing that because humans are social animals, they 
constantly compare themselves to others and strive to comport and compete so as to achieve 
heightened social status). 
185. The concept of “tipping points” in group behavior was first developed by sociologist 
Morton Grodzins, who used it to examine the “white flight” phenomenon that occurred when 
levels of minority residence began to rise in historically white neighborhoods.  Morton Grodzins, 
Metropolitan Segregation, SCI. AM., Oct. 1957, at 24.  However, the tipping point concept has far 
broader implications in explaining how singular events or trendsetter actions can swiftly overturn 
preexisting social norms in a wide variety of settings.  See generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE 
TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000). 
186. See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and 
Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 209 (Mariano Tommasi 
& Kathyrn Ierulli eds., 1995); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, 
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992, 993 (1992); Robert 
Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1577, 1586–89 (2000) (describing how peer-to-peer influences can result in 
sometimes dramatic shifts in compliance equilibria); Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and 
Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 206–07 (1950). 
187. See generally M. Choisy, J.F. Guegan & P. Rohani, Chapter 22: Mathematical Modeling 
of Infectious Diseases Dynamics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES: MODERN 
METHODOLOGIES 379 (Michel Tibayrenc ed., 2007) (discussing the various mathematical models 
used to analyze epidemic outbreaks based on the critical mass of infected individuals, the number 
of susceptible individuals, and other factors). 
188. GLADWELL, supra note 185, at 6. 
189. An information cascade occurs when individuals decide that others have superior 
information and the individuals adopt the position of others on the assumption that they have 
superior information.  See generally Hirshleifer, supra note 186.  Reputational cascades occur 
when trend setters adopt a new norm and others follow suit either to curry favor or avoid censure.  
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
683, 685–87 (1999). 
6_LAVOIE 3/9/2013  1:36 PM 
2013] Am I My Brother’s Keeper? 857 
snowballing effects draw their strength from the fact that most social 
groups strive for homogeneity.190  This tipping-point effect can apply 
both in the context of endorsing a new social norm, as well as 
condemning an old one.191 
The same principle applies to ethical situations.  While one individual 
cannot singlehandedly change the world, he can influence those around 
him in ways that ultimately have profound consequences.192  Imagine a 
crowd of people gathered for a peaceful protest.  One individual’s 
unilateral act of violence does not convert the protesters into a mob.  
However, the way that others respond might.  If no one objects to the 
violence, then that sends a message to others in the crowd that the group 
finds violence acceptable, and the peaceful protest may quickly cascade 
into mayhem.  Conversely, if members of the crowd censure and act 
against the initial violence, the peaceful purpose of the group is 
reaffirmed and cohesion to the original norm is maintained.  One 
individual cannot unilaterally impose an ethical change on a group, but 
his example can prompt others to question their views.193  When a 
person takes a principled stand in the face of a contrary norm, the 
present has been changed for those around him and good may ultimately 
result. 
This Article presents a plea to practitioners to raise concerns with 
clients even when it is uncomfortable to do so.  Even if an attorney feels 
constrained to provide zealous advice to a client, she should note that 
there is still both a moral and purely legal dimension to the question.194  
 
190. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 6–7 (Richard C. Atkinson et al. eds., 7th ed. 
1995) (discussing the tendency of most individuals to want to conform their behavior); Dan M. 
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 352–61 (1997) 
(discussing social conformity as an element of deterrence). 
191. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 614 (2000) (“Individuals are also more likely to view conduct as worthy of 
condemnation when they know that others condemn it.  Indeed, studies suggest that the opinions 
of one’s peers more significantly influence one’s moral attitudes toward various forms of conduct 
than does the status of those forms of conduct under the law.”) 
192. See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 189, at 688–89 (discussing the wide variety of 
social movements evidencing cascade theory). 
193. Or to tap into the pop culture wisdom of Star Trek: “‘One man cannot summon the 
future.’  ‘But one man can change the present!’” Star Trek: Mirror Mirror (NBC television 
broadcast Oct. 6, 1967) (discussion in which Captain Kirk urges an alternate-universe Mr. Spock 
to work from within to change the brutal Empire he is sworn to defend), quoted in SUSAN 
SACKETT, FRED GOLDSTEIN & STAN GOLDSTEIN, STAR TREK SPEAKS 113 (1979). 
194. It is important to note that nothing in the zealous advocacy norm in fact prevents lawyers 
from raising moral, ethical, or other concerns with clients.  To the contrary, the ABA Model 
Rules acknowledge that these factors can be incorporated into client advice.  See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice.  In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only 
to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors that may 
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By standing up for a duty to the system and noting the harm a tax 
avoidance transaction presents to the system, the practitioner may give 
her client or other attorneys dealing with the transaction the strength to 
question their own views about the appropriateness of their actions 
(even if they are technically legal).  By doing so, the attorney not only 
impacts the group dynamic within the business ethics context, but 
serves as an example that can be the tipping point for other tax lawyers 
to question the true ethical norms in play.  This is not to say that 
speaking out is easy—as it may cause risks for those who do it—but the 
more frequently it is done, the better.195 
Outside specific client settings, it is especially important that high-
profile tax practitioners and academics take up the cause and publically 
advocate for a strong gatekeeping norm since these trendsetters will 
have an oversized impact on the behavior of others.196  Consequently, 
anything that can be done to make it easier for attorneys to follow their 
conscience should be done to promote individual action and the 
importance of individual action itself should not be easily dismissed. 
3. Encouraging Gatekeeping 
Hastening a consensus regarding tax gatekeeping will require the 
creation of incentives for individual attorneys, and the bar as a whole, to 
willingly assume a gatekeeping function.197  One means of achieving 
this is to appeal to their self-interest.  As discussed earlier, one element 
of self-interest—avoiding future Government regulation of the 
 
be relevant to the client’s situation.”). 
195. Speaking out in this manner may also hold a silver lining in terms of relieving an 
attorney’s personal angst regarding his role in past questionable transactions and his anxiety over 
the psychic costs he will incur struggling with such transactions in the future if nothing changes.   
196. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 37–
38 (2010) (“But oftentimes change is only possible through the facilitation of specific types of 
individuals, variously known as ‘change agents,’ ‘opinion leaders,’ and ‘norm entrepreneurs,’ 
whose native abilities and social positions can encourage others to adopt a new norm.  They may 
have extensive and diverse personal relationships that allow the rapid spread of new ideas.  They 
may have knowledge about a vast array of issues or a technical expertise that gives credibility to 
the information and opinions they provide.  They may be especially convincing in their 
arguments and possess a high ‘social intelligence’ that lets them recognize the value of change.  
Or they may have a combination of these and other attributes.”). 
197. Of course, internal motivations are also important.  One’s internal self-image may be 
linked to being an honest person and acting ethically in all their affairs.  Consequently, the 
importance of general indoctrination into the ethical nature of gatekeeping should not be 
overlooked.  For instance, tax LL.M. programs might consider making a tax ethics course a 
required element of their degree.  Based on the author’s research, currently only one (Boston 
University) of the top six tax LL.M. programs (New York University, Georgetown University, 
University of Florida, Northwestern University, Boston University, and Miami University) makes 
ethics a required course. 
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profession—is already present.198  Other factors, however, discourage 
attorneys from counseling clients against aggressive positions, including 
a fear that raising concern about technically legal transactions would 
result in losing that client’s future business.  To change this dynamic, it 
is necessary to (1) create a conflict of interest that requires attorneys to 
raise the broader ethical considerations despite general business distain 
for such considerations, and/or (2) change the prevailing business norms 
to be more receptive to considerations other than profit maximization 
and strict legal compliance. 
One way of creating such a conflict of interest would be for the 
Government to pursue a more public and targeted enforcement effort 
that focuses on clients who previously participated in an aggressive 
 
198. The ABA’s recent experience with efforts to subject lawyers to increased money 
laundering and terrorist funding reporting is a case in point.  The Financial Action Task Force 
(“FATF”) is an international organization focused on combatting money laundering and terrorist 
financing.  Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task Force and Its 2008 
Lawyer Guidance, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 3, 5–6.  The FATF has made a number of 
recommendations in this regard (the “FATF 40+9 Recommendations”) which cover the 
gatekeeping obligations of various intermediaries (including lawyers) who could inadvertently 
facilitate money laundering and terrorist financing activity.  See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF 
40 RECOMMENDATIONS (2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/ 
FATF%20Standards%20-2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 9 
SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (SR) ON TERRORIST FINANCING (TF) (2004), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/8/17/34849466.pdf.  More recently, the FATF issued specific 
guidance for lawyers regarding the FATF 40+9 Recommendations.  FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 
RBA GUIDANCE FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (2008), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/5/58/41584211.pdf.  FATF members (including the United States) are charged 
with implementing the FATF 40+9 Recommendations.  Terry, supra, at 6–7.  The FATF 40+9 
Recommendations include gatekeeper guidelines regarding, among other matters, customer due 
diligence, recordkeeping, and the obligation to report suspicious transactions (without tipping off 
clients).  Id. at 10.  While in some jurisdictions these gatekeeping recommendations have been 
implemented by applying them in a fulsome manner to attorneys, the United States has yet to do 
so.  Id. at 36.  Instead, the ABA has been involved in proactive efforts to shape any anti-money 
laundering obligations that might eventually be imposed on U.S. attorneys and is pursuing 
increased self-regulation regarding these matters.  See generally Kevin L Shepherd, The 
Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach to Client Due Diligence: The Imperative for 
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for U.S. Lawyers, 2010 J. PROF. LAW. 83 (discussing the 
current and proposed U.S. implementation of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations and the ABA’s 
responses).  Significantly, in 2010 the ABA House of Delegates adopted a set of best practices 
guidelines in this area.  ABA, VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO 
DETECT AND COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/116.authchec
kdam.pdf.  Hopefully, such self-regulation efforts can avoid the need for more intrusive direct 
government regulation.  Letter from ABA President Stephen Zack (Apr. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/2011/2011apr08_goodpractices_o.au
thcheckdam.pdf (“[B]y following the Voluntary Guidance, lawyers and the legal profession can 
help eliminate the need for federal legislation or agency regulations that could conflict with 
existing state bar ethical rules, interfere with and undermine the confidential attorney-client 
relationship, and adversely affect client service.”).  
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transaction.  This effort would have a two-pronged effect: when 
advising a particular client who is seeking aggressive advice, the 
practitioner would need to consider not only the interests of the current 
client, but also the interests of his other clients and his own future 
livelihood.  If being overly zealous for one client puts other clients at a 
higher risk for audit, then that conflict of interest could prompt the 
attorney to temper his advice.  Acceding to the aggressive advice 
desired by a client would also potentially jeopardize the attorney’s 
future earnings since other clients would be less inclined to hire a 
representative who would draw heightened scrutiny to them.  Indeed, 
such publicized enforcement activity can help reduce the competitive 
pressures that lead to a legal race to the bottom.  A taxpayer who knows 
that aggressive tax planners serve as audit lightning rods has an 
incentive to seek out practitioners who have a good reputation with the 
Government, and presumably are more evenhanded in their legal 
conclusions.199 
The Government could also take a more direct approach to 
intentionally create conflicts of interest between tax lawyers and their 
clients.  For instance, the Government could modify the attorney-client 
privilege200 in tax situations or override normal client confidentiality 
rules201 by legally requiring certain disclosures to the Government of 
specified client actions.202  Indeed, in promulgating regulations dealing 
 
199. An alternative means to achieve this impact would be to require taxpayers to disclose on 
their tax return that they received negative advice regarding a particular transaction or position 
taken on the return.  Thus, even if they were able to ultimately shift responsibility to a lawyer 
with a more lenient bent, they would still need to disclose the earlier negative advice.  Thus, a 
lawyer potentially issuing negative advice would have more sway to persuade the client to pursue 
a less aggressive course rather than merely having the client simply shop for more lenient advice. 
200. In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence (Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 
1926 (1975)), which consciously left the law of evidentiary privileges to common law 
development.  Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 501 provides that the federal common law of 
privileges applies to federal question and federal criminal cases, while state law privilege rules 
are applicable to cases in federal courts where state law is at issue.  FED. R. EVID. 501.  
Consequently, the federal common law attorney-client privilege is applicable for federal income 
tax issues absent future Congressional action to circumscribe the privilege.  Significantly, client 
identity is generally not protected under the attorney-client privilege, even in tax shelter 
situations.  Richard Lavoie, Making a List and Checking It Twice: Must Tax Attorneys Divulge 
Who’s Naughty and Nice?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 141, 202–04 (2004). 
201. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2011) (limiting attorney 
confidentiality if disclosure otherwise required by law).  
202. For instance, as part of implementing the FACTA 40+9 Recommendations, some 
countries have explicitly subjected attorneys to their strict anti-money laundering laws.  Terry, 
supra note 198, at 29–36.  Such direct Government action raises the real risk of overreaching by 
the Government.  Government interventions in the attorney-client relationship should therefore be 
narrowly tailored to address targeted situations where attorney driven self-regulation has been 
shown to be insufficient to address the Government’s legitimate interests.  Some have questioned 
the appropriateness of applying money laundering and terrorist funding reporting obligations to 
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with the disclosure of certain reportable transactions, the Government, 
perhaps inadvertently, created just such a conflict of interest.203  Of 
course, at the extreme, the Government could potentially eliminate all 
privilege or confidentiality for tax planning matters and then even 
require practitioners to report aggressive client activity.204  But this is 
exactly the type of Government interference with the profession that 
most everyone would agree would be detrimental to all involved.  
However, targeted Government actions touching on these matters at the 
margins could be effective in encouraging attorneys to generally 
distance their legal considerations from their client’s business goals and 
highlighting in a tangible way the real risk to the tax bar associated with 
a continued unwillingness to effectively self-regulate.  
4. Relieving the Anti-Gatekeeping Pressure 
Another way to encourage attorneys to question the advisability of 
aggressive but arguably legal transactions is to make such 
considerations more germane to clients, and thereby relieve some of the 
outside pressures acting to suppress a gatekeeping function.  A primary 
reason why tax lawyers hesitate to raise issues regarding aggressive tax 
planning is that their clients are unlikely to be receptive to such “non-
legal” advice coming from their legal advisors.205  Businesses in the 
United States are focused primarily on their bottom line and 
consequently view the law as merely a system of rules to be gamed for 
the sole goal of profit maximization.206  Under this approach, as long as 
a transaction is technically “legal” then it should be pursued to obtain 
the expected economic benefit irrespective of any non-financial 
considerations.207  This  perception is compounded by the conventional 
 
attorneys on the ground that lawyers are only infrequently implicated in such activities.  Terry, 
supra note 198, at 12.  Conversely, when it becomes apparent that the bar is integrally involved in 
facilitating actions legitimately disfavored by the Government (like the two tax shelter waves 
previously discussed), direct regulation of the attorney-client relationship can be more easily 
justified.  
203. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6112-1 (2011).  This regulation requires any material advisor to a 
reportable transaction (as defined in 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(1) (2011)) to maintain a list of 
investors involved in such transaction which must be furnished to the Government upon request. 
204. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client 
Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 269–72 
(1992) (noting that the attorney-client privilege is essentially a matter of court and legislative 
grace that could be eliminated except in certain narrow criminal situations where the privilege 
might claim a Constitutional basis). 
205. Wilkins, supra note 128, at 2075–76.  
206. William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The Commensurability of Corporate Profits 
and Human Rights, 26 NORTE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 141, 148 (2012). 
207. Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes To Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on 
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1602 (2006). 
6_LAVOIE 3/9/2013  1:36 PM 
862 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  44 
wisdom that taxpaying is an area of purely legal inquiry, devoid of any 
moral considerations,208 and by general societal trends that weaken the 
taxpaying norm.209  A tax lawyer’s ability to counsel against this 
approach is made almost impossibly difficult when the judiciary 
actually endorses such a literalistic approach to interpreting the tax 
laws.210  Given the uncertainty today regarding judicial attitudes, a 
lawyer may find it extremely difficult to refuse to advise against an 
aggressive transaction where a literalist court may uphold the 
transaction.  Consequently, clarifying the proper method of statutory 
interpretation in tax cases is absolutely crucial to reestablishing a tax 
gatekeeping norm.211  While recent court decisions have moved back 
toward traditional anti-abuse notions in scrutinizing tax-motivated 
transactions, the underlying schism within the judiciary and the tax 
academy regarding the interpretation of statutes remains.212  While the 
Government has taken an important step toward clarifying this matter 
by codifying the economic substance doctrine, more should be done to 
solidify judicial approaches in this area and thereby reduce the 
uncertainty for practitioners in predicting the likely judicial response to 
an aggressive transaction.   
There are several mechanisms by which this could be accomplished.  
First, a general anti-abuse rule could be statutorily adopted.213  This has 
been done in several countries with generally positive effects, despite 
practitioner criticism.214  Alternatively, given the long history of 
judicially created anti-abuse doctrines in the United States, a simpler 
 
208. See supra notes 75–76 (discussing how courts and public figures do not believe that 
moral considerations are in any way implicated when an individual uses the law to avoid paying 
taxes). 
209. See supra Part III.B.4 (illustrating the general trend in distrust for the government and the 
accompanying shift in seeing taxpaying as an extraction of wealth rather than a patriotic duty). 
210. Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law, supra note 46, at 190–92. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 195–99. 
213. Id. at 195. 
214. See, e.g., Benjamin Alarie, Trebilcock on Tax Avoidance, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 623, 624–
25 (2010) (noting how a prolific author on tax law criticized the idea of an effective general anti-
avoidance rule (“GAAR”) and believed that courts will continue to strictly interpret tax codes 
indefinitely); Julie Cassidy, “To GAAR or Not to GAAR—That is the Question:” Canadian and 
Australian Attempts to Combat Tax Avoidance, 36 OTTAWA L. REV. 259, 259, 312–13 (2004) 
(depicting how both Canada and Australia have enacted GAAR rules and how the Canadian 
GAAR has certain provisions that are especially helpful for preventing tax evasion through 
aggressive tax planning); Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General Anti-
Avoidance Rules, 54 SMU L. REV. 83, 84 (2001) (reviewing how many countries around the 
world have enacted GAAR rules); Tim Edgar, Building a Better GAAR, 27 VA. TAX REV. 833, 
836 (2008) (expounding how in countries that have not enacted GAARs there is a continuous 
debate about enacting a GAAR because judicially made anti-avoidance doctrines are seen as 
ineffective). 
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approach would be to merely statutorily reaffirm the appropriateness of 
courts continuing to apply such doctrines, and to eschew literal 
interpretations of the tax code that are at odds with the intended purpose 
and scope of the subject provisions.215 
Another approach for making businesses more receptive to 
cautionary advice from their attorneys would be to alter the business 
culture of their clients using public censure.216  In the past, public 
outcry over corporations expatriating to avoid U.S. taxes was used to 
question, or try to reverse, a number of such transactions.217  Today, 
many corporations pay very low effective tax rates.218  Exposing such 
rates might well create a public outcry demanding that corporate 
citizens pay their fair share of the tax burden.219 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated that the tax bar’s failure to effectively 
constrain its actions on behalf of clients has forced the Government to 
impose constraints on the tax bar through direct regulation.  As has 
happened with securities lawyers, this direct Government regulation 
 
215. Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers, supra note 11, at 62–63. 
216. Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong with Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse, 62 TAX L. REV. 
539, 539 (2009); Sandeep Gopalan, Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 757, 758–59 (2007); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 
1812 (2001). 
217. Orsolya Kun, Corporate Inversions: The Interplay of Tax, Corporate, and Economic 
Implications, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 313, 344 (2004); Developments in the Law—Jobs and Borders: 
VI. Drawing Lines around Corporate Inversion, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2270, 2274–75 (2005). 
218.  See Citizens for Tax Justice Says ‘No-Tax’ Corporations Continue to Avoid Taxes, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Apr. 10, 2012, LEXIS 2012 TNT 69-19 (noting a report showing that twenty-six 
large U.S. corporations paid no U.S. taxes in 2011); CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, CORPORATE 
TAXPAYERS AND CORPORATE TAX DODGERS 2008–10, at 3 (2011), available at http://www. 
ctj.org/corporatetaxdodgers/CorporateTaxDodgersReport.pdf (finding the average effective 
corporate tax rate in 2009 and 2010 for 280 large U.S. corporations was 17.3%, with a quarter of 
the companies studied paying below 10%). 
219. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax 
Information Increase Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 95, 104–05 (2005) 
(“Publicity strengthens penalties because it increases the chance of getting caught (since members 
of the public, especially tax experts, can study returns) and it increases chances of public shaming 
for non-compliance.”); Marc Linder, Tax Glasnost’ for Millionaires: Peeking behind the Veil of 
Ignorance along the Publicity-Privacy Continuum, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 951, 975 
(1990) (advocating for the publication of millionaires’ tax returns); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer 
Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1144 (2003) (“Empirical research and 
compliance theories also support this position, suggesting that publicity can play a positive role in 
discouraging noncompliant behavior and increasing the public’s commitment to the tax system.”); 
Paul Schwartz, The Future of Tax Privacy, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 883, 895–96 (2008) (noting how 
corporate tax information is publically available through SEC’s online EDGAR database); Joseph 
J. Thorndike, Show Us the Money,123 TAX NOTES 148, 148–49 (2009) (discussing how public 
disclosure of individuals’ tax returns could prompt tax reform). 
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could become even more onerous if the tax bar fails to embrace a strong 
gatekeeping function on its own.220  In order to preserve the traditional 
and important tax planning role of attorneys in business and personal 
situations, the bar must be willing to curb its support for aggressive tax 
planning techniques.  This will require a departure from traditional 
notions that every client must be represented zealously without 
consideration of ancillary adverse consequences to society or third 
parties (including the attorney himself).  This standpoint is in line with 
both the historical approach to practicing tax law, as well as emerging 
trends arguing in favor of a general obligation of attorneys to 
counterbalance their zealous advocacy for a client against a duty to 
support and strengthen the substantive body of law in which they 
practice.   
The tax bar should begin a forthright discussion of these issues 
immediately, with the goal of reaching a strong consensus in favor of 
adopting a formal ethical gatekeeping norm.  Achieving this consensus 
will require weakening the competitive and other forces that align 
attorneys too closely with clients’ profit maximization goals.  But with 
sufficient resolve on the part of a cadre of attorneys who see the stakes 
involved, these forces can be overcome. 
Looking beyond the tax bar, the impact that the degradation of a 
gatekeeping norm in the tax area has had on tax practitioners should 
serve as a warning to all lawyers to heed calls for a gatekeeping 
function in their particular fields.  While historically it has been argued 
that the tax field is unique in this regard due to the self-assessing nature 
of the income tax, that uniqueness is less true today.  As the United 
States moves ever closer to a regulatory state where more and more 
individual and business actions are circumscribed by detailed statutory 
and regulatory frameworks, attorneys will be increasingly called upon 
to promote adherence to these rules.  A zealous advocacy norm will 
promote gamesmanship within these frameworks and ultimately harm 
the rule of law.  Additionally, many of the forces described herein that 
have caused tax practitioners to eschew their historical gatekeeping 
function find direct analogues in other practice areas.  The tax 
experience provides a cautionary tale for the entire bar on the 
importance of affirmatively embracing a gatekeeping function as a 
means of saving a zealous advocacy norm that otherwise could be 
completely swept away. 
 
220. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text (illustrating the various forms of 
Government regulation that have already been levied against the tax bar). 
